




ALEXANDRA L. KLEIN 
Most states’ method of execution statutes afford broad discretion to 
executive agencies to create execution protocols. Inmates have 
challenged this discretion, arguing that these statutes 
unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to executive agencies, 
violating the state’s nondelegation and separation of powers doctrines. 
State courts routinely use the nondelegation doctrine, in contrast to the 
doctrine’s historic disfavor in federal courts. Despite its uncertain 
status, the nondelegation doctrine is a useful analytical tool to examine 
decision-making in capital punishment.  
 
This Article critically evaluates responsibility for administering capital 
punishment through the lens of nondelegation. It analyzes state court 
decisions upholding broad legislative delegations to agencies and 
identifies common themes in this jurisprudence. This Article positions 
legislative delegation in parallel with historic and modern execution 
practices that utilize responsibility-shifting mechanisms to minimize 
participant responsibility in carrying out capital sentences and argues 
that legislative delegation serves a similar function of minimizing 
accountability in state-authorized killing.  
 
The nondelegation doctrine provides useful perspectives on capital 
punishment because the doctrine emphasizes accountability, 
transparency, and perceptions of legitimacy, core themes that permeate 
historic and modern death penalty practices. Creating execution 
protocols carries a high potential for arbitrary action due to limited 
procedural constraints, secrecy, and broad statutorily enacted 
discretion. The decision to authorize capital punishment is a separate 
policy decision than the decision of how that punishment is carried out. 
This Article frames a more robust nondelegation analysis for method of 
execution statutes and argues that legislators determined to utilize the 
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penalty should carry greater accountability for investigating and 
selecting methods of execution and should not be allowed to delegate 
these decisions. 
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“If we feel the need to actually protect the moral misgivings of 
the people participating, then there is no greater evidence of 
what we are doing is wrong.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has reshaped the American death penalty by imposing 
guiding principles that attempted to narrow legislators’ and jurors’ discretion in 
decisions about who should be sentenced to death and how those decisions are 
 
 1 Brigid Delaney, Bryan Stevenson: If It’s Not Right to Rape a Rapist, How Can It Be 
OK to Kill a Killer?, GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015 
/feb/17/bryan-stevenson-if-its-not-right-to-a-rapist-how-can-it-be-ok-to-kill-a-killer 
[https://perma.cc/J3MZ-5BAQ] (quote from an interview with Bryan Stevenson).  
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made.2 Despite these efforts, the death penalty remains vulnerable to criticisms 
about arbitrariness, inadequate standards, and excessive discretion.3 Execution 
procedures are equally susceptible to these critiques.4 
Most states’ method of execution statutes grants broad discretion to 
executive agencies to create execution protocols, including selecting the drugs 
to be used in lethal injection.5 Death row inmates have unsuccessfully 
challenged these statutes as unconstitutional legislative delegations that violate 
state constitutions’ separation of power doctrines,6 with one notable exception.  
In Hobbs v. Jones,7 the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the Arkansas 
General Assembly had “abdicated its responsibility” by giving the Arkansas 
Department of Corrections the “unfettered discretion to determine all protocols 
 
 2 See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334–36 (1976); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271–72 (1976); Proffitt 
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251–53 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).  
 3 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“40 years 
of further experience make it increasingly clear that the death penalty is imposed arbitrarily, 
i.e., without the ‘reasonable consistency’ legally necessary to reconcile its use with the 
Constitution’s commands.”); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality 
opinion) (“[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional 
responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious 
infliction of the death penalty.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (joint opinion 
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (“[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on 
a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, 
that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly 
arbitrary and capricious action.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, 
J., concurring) (“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being 
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders 
in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a 
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been 
imposed.”) (footnotes omitted); BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE 
DEATH PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 227 (2017). 
 4 See CORINNA BARRETT LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION: WHY WE CAN’T GET IT RIGHT AND 
WHAT IT SAYS ABOUT US 1–3 (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1–3) (on file with the Ohio State 
Law Journal) [hereinafter LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION].  
 5 See, e.g., N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, EXECUTION PROCEDURE MANUAL FOR SINGLE 
DRUG PROTOCOL (PENTOBARBITOL) 17 (Oct. 24, 2013), https://files.nc.gov/ncdps/docu 
ments/files/Protocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW3H-7VCH] [hereinafter NORTH CAROLINA 
PROTOCOL]; see also Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due 
Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1407 (2014) [hereinafter Berger, Lethal Injection].  
 6 See, e.g., Zink v. Lombardi, No. 2:12-CV-4209-NKL, 2012 WL 12828155, *8 (W.D. 
Mo. Nov. 16, 2012); Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012); Sims v. 
Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411, 
420–21 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994), aff’d, 648 A.2d. 423 (Del. 1994); Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 
1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam); Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000) (per 
curiam); State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 201 (Idaho 1981); State v. Ellis, 799 N.W.2d 267, 
289 (Neb. 2011); Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W. 2d 503, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc); 
Brown v. Vail, 237 P.3d 263, 270 (Wash. 2010) (en banc).  
 7 Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844 (Ark. 2012). 
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and procedures, most notably the chemicals to be used, for a state execution.”8 
This violated the state’s nondelegation doctrine and rendered Arkansas’s 
method of execution statute9 facially unconstitutional.10  
Despite Jones’s outlier status,11 the nondelegation doctrine is more relevant 
to death penalty administration than it seems at first glance. Justice Brennan’s 
dissent in McGautha v. California,12 which contended that the failure to set 
standards in capital cases violated the due process clause, relied on, inter alia, 
nondelegation cases to support his argument for the need to eliminate 
“legislative abdication” that resulted in arbitrary determinations in capital 
sentencing.13 Numerous scholars have examined accountability, discretion, 
deference, and responsibility in the death penalty for a variety of actors.14 None, 
however, have meaningfully considered the application of the nondelegation 
doctrine to death penalty administration. 
The nondelegation doctrine requires branches of government to comply 
with their constitutionally-prescribed spheres of authority by prohibiting the 
legislature from delegating pure legislative power to another branch.15 Although 
the nondelegation doctrine has not enjoyed robust treatment in federal courts,16 
state courts retain and apply it. Recent events at the Supreme Court have also 
signaled the possibility of a revival of the federal nondelegation doctrine.17 
 
 8 Id. at 854. 
 9 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617 (West 2011), amended by 2013 Ark. Laws Acts 139, 89th 
Gen. Assemb., Gen. Sess. (Ark. 2013). 
 10 Jones, 412 S.W.3d at 847; see Lauren E. Murphy, Note, Third Time’s a Charm: 
Whether Hobbs v. Jones Inspired a Durable Change to Arkansas’s Method of Execution Act, 
66 ARK. L. REV. 813, 814 (2013).  
 11 See Zink v. Lombardi, No. 2:12-CV-4209-NKL, 2012 WL 12828155, at *7 (W.D. 
Mo. Nov. 16, 2012) (discussing Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844 (Ark. 2012)).  
 12 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 252 (1971), reh’g granted, judgment vacated 
by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).  
 13 Id. at 251–53, 253 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 14 See, e.g., MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE ETHICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF EVIL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 16–18 (2011); Eric Berger, 
In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic Pedigree, and 
Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 17–18, 44–50, 61 (2010); Eric 
Berger, The Executioners’ Dilemmas, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 731, 746, 750–52 (2015); Deborah 
W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses 
of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 68–
69, 100 (2002); Markus Dirk Dubber, The Pain of Punishment, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 545, 546, 
587 (1996); Joseph L. Hoffman, Where’s the Buck?–Juror Misperception of Sentencing 
Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1140 (1995); Michael J. Osofsky, 
Albert Bandura, & Philip G. Zimbardo, The Role of Moral Disengagement in the Execution 
Process, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 371, 373, 385 (2005).  
 15 See infra Part II (discussing the nondelegation doctrine).  
 16 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130–31 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“Nevertheless, since 1935, the Court has uniformly rejected nondelegation arguments and 
has upheld provisions that authorized agencies to adopt important rules pursuant to 
extraordinarily capricious standards.”).  
 17 See infra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.  
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In Gundy v. United States,18 although a plurality of the Supreme Court 
upheld Congress’s broad delegation of authority to the Attorney General to 
determine the applicability of registration requirements for certain sex 
offenders, three Justices dissented, contending that the nondelegation doctrine 
should apply.19 Justice Alito’s concurrence in the judgment indicated his 
willingness to reconsider nondelegation.20 
The nondelegation doctrine implicates government accountability, 
transparency, and perceptions of legitimacy of legislative conduct.21 These 
issues carry great significance in capital punishment. Administrative structures 
in capital punishment obscure responsibility for, and decision-making in, state-
authorized killing in many ways. Legislatures confer substantial discretion on 
executive agencies or prison officials to establish and implement execution 
protocols.22 Statutes and execution protocols conceal executioners’ identities.23 
Information about execution drugs and processes is often exempted from states’ 
freedom of information acts,24 and corrections agencies usually do not have to 
comply with state administrative procedure acts when creating execution 
protocols.25 
The decline of capital punishment only increases the urgency of these 
concerns. As Brandon Garrett points out, only a handful of prosecutors in a few 
counties are responsible for the continued use of the penalty.26 States have 
expanded their choices of methods of execution in response to botched 
executions and lethal injection drug shortages.27 The decline of the death 
penalty, along with the challenges states face in conducting executions, 
increases the risk of arbitrariness.28 How decisions about the death penalty are 
made, and who makes them, matter just as much as what those decisions are.  
 
 18 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).  
 19 Id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 20 Id. (Alito, J., concurring).  
 21 See infra Part V.A.  
 22 See infra Part II.B.  
 23 See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-233 (West 2020); Sandra Davidson & Michael Barajas, 
Masking the Executioner and the Source of Execution Drugs, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 45 (2014); 
see also infra Part II.B. 
 24 See ROBIN KONRAD, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., BEHIND THE CURTAIN: SECRECY 
AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 14–16 (Robert Dunham & Ngozi Ndulue 
eds.), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/pdf/SecrecyReport-2.f1560295685.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9TR3-JZAD] [hereinafter KONRAD, BEHIND THE CURTAIN] (surveying 
state secrecy laws).  
 25 See infra note 273 and accompanying text. 
 26 GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 3, at 190–92 (“Even within the largest death 
penalty states, just a handful of counties produce the death sentences that result in 
executions.”). 
 27 See Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1361 
(2014); see also Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has 
Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 63 (2007).  
 28 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–56 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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This Article draws upon nondelegation and capital punishment scholarship 
to examine the nondelegation doctrine in state method of execution statutes and 
execution protocols. It critically evaluates state court decisions upholding broad 
legislative delegation to executive agencies to create execution protocols. It 
illustrates the relationship between these practices and historic and modern 
execution procedures that delegate responsibility within the executive branch 
for carrying out state-authorized killing. Legislative delegation is one of many 
methods to minimize responsibility for carrying out capital punishment.  
Part II analyzes modern and historic methods of execution. Executions 
utilize intra-executive delegation or other methods of spreading responsibility 
among participants carrying out executions. How the state chooses to kill, and 
the way that burden is spread, illustrates why the nondelegation doctrine offers 
a unique perspective on the role of the death penalty in American society. 
Part III outlines the nondelegation doctrine, with a primary focus on the way 
in which states have formulated their nondelegation doctrines. It also discusses 
the potential for a shift in the application of the doctrine in federal courts after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gundy. The potential for increased scrutiny 
could serve to reframe the debate about delegation in method of execution 
statutes. Part IV examines litigation in which capital defendants challenged a 
state’s method of execution statute on nondelegation grounds and explores the 
reasoning courts relied on to authorize broad delegations to agencies to create 
execution protocols with limited guidance. This Part illustrates common themes 
in nondelegation cases and judicial support of broad legislative delegation. 
Part V contends that capital punishment schemes that rely on shifting 
responsibility and minimizing accountability undermine government 
accountability, transparency, and perceptions of legitimacy of the death penalty. 
The justifications for delegation are not met by the reality of capital punishment, 
particularly because judicial decision-making relies on unjustified assumptions 
of agency expertise. Inadequate procedural controls, secrecy, and minimal 
legislative guidance and oversight present a substantial risk of arbitrary action. 
It concludes by offering a stronger nondelegation analysis for method of 
execution statutes.  
Like executioners, legislatures seek to shift the responsibility for state-
authorized killing to other individuals or agencies. Spreading responsibility for 
killing absolves entities of the need to grapple with the true consequences of 
capital punishment. This Article contends that the decision to authorize capital 
punishment is a separate policy decision than the decision of how that 
punishment is carried out. In light of the stakes of carrying out capital 
punishment and the potential for extraordinary harm, legislators determined to 
utilize the penalty should carry greater accountability for investigating and 
selecting methods of execution and should not be allowed to delegate these 
decisions.  
2020] NONDELEGATING DEATH 929 
II. METHODS OF EXECUTION 
Deciding how an inmate dies and who kills29 them is a thorny and long-
standing issue in capital punishment. A hallmark of the American system of 
capital punishment is willingness within the executive branch to pass the duty 
of killing, and the details of that action, to another person or institution.30 
Legislative delegation to agencies, discussed infra, is properly characterized as 
one component of the broader system of responsibility-shifting in capital 
punishment.31 
Despite the difference between legislative and intra-executive delegation, 
recourse to responsibility-shifting mechanisms minimizes responsibility for the 
“machinery of death.”32 Parts A and B explore delegation in historic and modern 
execution protocols. In historic executions, executive agents responsible for the 
act of killing attempted, and often succeeded, in delegating killing to others.33 
Modern execution protocols demonstrate similar patterns through mechanical 
or structural methods of distancing involvement in killing or spreading 
responsibility through the execution team.34 Each of these elements permits 
individuals and institutions to disclaim responsibility in killing.  
A. Historic Delegation and Responsibility for Killing 
Historic accounts of executions include startling and disturbing examples of 
delegation on the part of the executive official responsible for conducting 
executions. Timothy Kaufman-Osborn describes a practice in medieval England 
by which some convicts could receive commutations or pardons if they took a 
turn as an executioner.35 This practice continued in colonial America; 
condemned prisoners could receive a reprieve in exchange for executing their 
 
 29 I use the term “kill” deliberately in this Article. Regardless of one’s opinion about 
capital punishment, the death penalty is the state-sanctioned act of killing another human 
being. Using sanitized language will not change that fact and seems inappropriate when 
discussing responsibility for state-sanctioned killing. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Essay, 
Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1622 (1986).  
 30 See infra notes 41–50 and accompanying text.  
 31 See infra notes 316–18 and accompanying text. 
 32 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari) (“From this day forward, I shall no longer tinker with the machinery of death.”); 
Rumbaugh v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 919, 920–21 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari).  
 33 See infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 35 TIMOTHY V. KAUFMAN-OSBORN, FROM NOOSE TO NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
AND THE LATE LIBERAL STATE 66 (2002).  
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fellow prisoners.36 Sheriffs typically carried out executions,37 although they 
“tended to delegate these responsibilities when they could.”38 In addition to 
seeking prisoners to carry out executions, sheriffs would attempt to hire 
individuals to carry out executions.39 Prisoners’ participation in executions did 
not, however, end when hanging did. One of the executioners at the botched 
execution of Willie Francis in 1946 was an inmate at the Louisiana State 
Penitentiary named Vincent Venezia.40 
This “democratized” early American death penalty moved the responsibility 
for carrying out executions “from a small set of specialists to a diffuse group of 
amateurs, where it would remain as long as executions were conducted by 
hanging.”41 The general public distaste for executioners may explain these 
delegation practices.42 The sheriff could fulfill his executive duties while 
passing off the unpleasant task to someone else.43  
 
 36 See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 36 (2002) 
(“Maryland found it so difficult to appoint an executioner that the colony turned to a 
succession of criminals, each of whom was reprieved from a death sentence in exchange for 
agreeing to serve as hangman for a term of years or life.”); id. at 37 (describing specific cases 
in which prisoners facing death sentences hanged other prisoners); JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL 
& UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
262 (2012) [hereinafter BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL].  
 37 See BANNER, supra note 36, at 36; CRAIG BRANDON, THE ELECTRIC CHAIR: AN 
UNNATURAL AMERICAN HISTORY 25 (1999); see also KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 35, at 
65–66 (discussing the responsibilities of sheriffs in medieval England).  
 38 BANNER, supra note 36, at 36; see AUSTIN SARAT, KATHERINE BLUMSTEIN, AUBREY 
JONES, HEATHER RICHARD, & MADELINE SPRUNG-KEYSER, GRUESOME SPECTACLES: 
BOTCHED EXECUTIONS AND AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 40 (2014) [hereinafter SARAT, 
GRUESOME SPECTACLES]. 
 39 BANNER, supra note 36, at 36–37 (“[B]ills submitted by sheriffs for reimbursement 
often included entries for payments to several other people for actually carrying out the 
hanging.”).  
 40 See Deborah W. Denno, When Willie Francis Died: The “Disturbing” Story Behind 
One of the Eighth Amendment’s Most Enduring Standards of Risk, in DEATH PENALTY 
STORIES 17, 41–43 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009).  
 41 BANNER, supra note 36, at 38.  
 42 See BANNER, supra note 36, at 36 (“In England and elsewhere in Europe, death 
sentences were carried out by professional executioners, specialists loathed by the public.”); 
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 70 (Richard 
Bellamy ed., Richard Davies trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1764) (“What are 
everyone’s feelings about the death penalty? We can read them in the indignation and 
contempt everyone feels for the hangman, who is after all the innocent executor of the public 
will . . . .”); BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL, supra note 36, at 262 (discussing public revulsion 
for executioners); Dubber, supra note 14, at 551 (describing public sentiment towards 
executioners).  
 43 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(discussing delegation as an abdication of responsibility while still receiving credit for 
having addressed a problem).  
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The inherent difficulties of hanging triggered other forms of intra-executive 
delegation. Hanging is often an ineffective and painful way to kill,44 despite 
attempts to use scientific principles to assess the proper length of rope and 
drop.45 A short drop chanced “painful death by slow suffocation.”46 In some 
public hangings, if a prisoner did not die instantly after the drop, family or 
friends might pull on the hanging prisoner’s legs to ensure that death came more 
swiftly.47 On the other hand, a longer drop or other miscalculation risked 
decapitation.48 As Stuart Banner explains: “In the 1870s, in an effort to make a 
painless death more likely, local officials in several places that still used the old 
downward method of hanging began trying longer drops.”49 Unfortunately, this 
led to near or complete decapitations, horrified observers, and sharp public 
criticism.50 
When conducting hangings, officials “sought methods of removing their 
own agency from the process of hanging.”51 State officials hired professionals 
to hang inmates.52 Alternatively, officials created automated gallows systems 
 
 44 See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 717 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., concurring 
and dissenting, Appendix A) (“The evidence presented on remand clearly showed that 
hanging creates a significant risk both of decapitation and of slow asphyxiation.”); BANNER, 
supra note 36, at 170–73 (discussing the problem of painless hanging and describing botched 
hangings); KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 35, at 116–20; SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, 
supra note 38, at 34–35, 39–41 (discussing the complexity of execution by hanging); ELIZA 
STEELWATER, THE HANGMAN’S KNOT: LYNCHING, LEGAL EXECUTION, AND AMERICA’S 
STRUGGLE WITH THE DEATH PENALTY 63 (2003) (describing the hanging of James McCaffry 
in 1851, who remained conscious and struggling for five minutes after the drop); Martin R. 
Gardner, Executions and Indignities—An Eighth Amendment Assessment of Methods of 
Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 96, 120 (1978); Anny Sauvageau, Romano 
LaHarpe, & Vernon J. Geberth, Agonal Sequences in Eight Filmed Hangings: Analysis of 
Respiratory and Movement Responses to Asphyxia by Hanging, 55 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1278, 
1278 (2010); see also Matt Soniak, Hanging Themselves Was the Only Way to See How 
Hanging Works, MENTALFLOSS (Mar. 31, 2012), http://mentalfloss.com/article/30340/he-
wanted-better-understand-hanging-so-he-hanged-himself-12-times [https://perma.cc/ 
DW6A-TVY5] (discussing Nicolas Minovici, who researched hanging by hanging himself 
and volunteers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).  
 45 See Campbell, 18 F.3d at 717 (Reinhardt, J., concurring and dissenting, Appendix A) 
(discussing drop tables for hangings); see also KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 35, at 122.  
 46 Campbell, 18 F.3d at 717 (Reinhardt, J., concurring and dissenting, Appendix A); 
BRANDON, supra note 37, at 35–36.  
 47 See SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 32–33.  
 48 Campbell, 18 F.3d at 718 (Reinhardt, J., concurring and dissenting, Appendix A) 
(“[E]very single expert who testified at the evidentiary hearing acknowledged at one point 
or another that some prisoners who are hanged in Washington may be decapitated.”).  
 49 BANNER, supra note 36, at 173.  
 50 See id. (describing the executions of Charles Jolly, Henry Hollenscheid, Samuel 
Frost, Patrick Hartnett, and James Stone); see also Campbell, 18 F.3d at 720 (Reinhardt, J., 
concurring and dissenting, Appendix A) (discussing the execution of Black Jack Ketchum 
in New Mexico).  
 51 BANNER, supra note 36, at 173–74.  
 52 Id. at 176.  
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that effectively “allowed condemned criminals to hang themselves.”53 When the 
prisoner stepped onto the gallows platform, a mechanical reaction would trigger 
the hanging either by jerking the prisoner up into the air, or dropping the 
prisoner.54 Francis Barker “invented, for his own 1905 execution, an electrical 
device that allowed him to release the trap door himself by pressing a button 
strapped to his thigh.”55 Automated devices appeared in other execution 
methods. In 1912, Andrija Mircovich, sentenced to die in Nevada, selected the 
firing squad as his method of execution.56 Confronted with the difficulty of 
finding anyone to perform the execution, Nevada “constructed a firing squad 
machine, mounting three rifles on a framework that fired the weapons” when 
strings were cut or pulled.57 One of the rifles was loaded with a blank.58 
The movement towards technologically driven (and purportedly more 
humane) methods of killing like the electric chair, the gas chamber, or lethal 
injection arose in part from public perceptions of the cruelty of botched 
hangings.59 Adopting more “humane”60 methods of killing that interposed 
technology or physical distance between the executioner and the condemned 
could make the act more impersonal, reducing executioners’ emotional 
burdens.61  
The gas chamber presented one opportunity to interpose technology or 
physical distance because the executioner did not come in contact with the 
condemned.62 In California, executioners mixed water and sulfuric acid in the 
 
 53 Id. at 174.  
 54 Id. (describing execution machines in Colorado, Connecticut, and Nebraska).  
 55 Id.  
 56 See Christopher Q. Cutler, Nothing Less than the Dignity of Man: Evolving 
Standards, Botched Executions and Utah’s Controversial Use of the Firing Squad, 50 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 335, 400 (2002–03); Deborah W. Denno, The Firing Squad as “A Known and 
Available Alternative Method of Execution” Post-Glossip, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749, 
790 (2016) [hereinafter, Denno, The Firing Squad].  
 57 Cutler, supra note 56, at 400; see also Denno, The Firing Squad, supra note 56, at 
790.  
 58 See Denno, The Firing Squad, supra note 56, at 790; see also Patty Cafferata, Capital 
Punishment Nevada Style, NEV. LAW., June 2010, at 3, 8.  
 59 See BANNER, supra note 36, at 176–77 (citing newspaper reports from that era); 
BRANDON, supra note 37, at 25–46 (discussing the shift in public sentiment away from 
hangings).  
 60 Cf. BANNER, supra note 36, at 200–01 (describing errors in lethal gas executions); 
SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 116 (“Five out of every one hundred 
executions by lethal gas had been botched.”). 
 61 See BANNER, supra note 36, at 204 (“Clinton Duffy, the warden at San Quentin 
during many of its gas chamber executions, surveyed the officers under his command and 
discovered that all of them preferred the gas chamber to the gallows. The men felt less 
‘directly responsible for the death of the condemned,’ he explained.”).  
 62 See id. at 196–97 (describing gas chamber executions). Michel Foucault makes the 
same point about the guillotine: “Death was reduced to a visible, but instantaneous event. 
Contact between the law, or those who carry it out, and the body of the criminal, is reduced 
to a split second. There is no physical confrontation; the executioner need be no more than a 
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“Mixing Room,” and a pipe carried the solution to reservoirs under the chair 
where the condemned would be strapped in to die.63 To kill the inmate, a 
member of the execution team pushed a lever that lowered a bundle of sodium 
cyanide crystals into the acid-water solution, producing hydrocyanic gas.64  
Technological developments also led to professional executioners; the 
complexity of the electric chair meant that killing was delegated to 
professionals, usually electricians.65 As methods of execution evolved, 
execution protocols and internal processes continued to adopt methods of 
responsibility shifting. The next section explores more recent delegation and 
responsibility-shifting mechanisms.  
B. Minimizing Accountability for Killing 
Modern execution protocols permit, and even encourage, delegation. The 
official conducting or supervising executions selects the executioner, who may 
not even work for the department of corrections.66 Florida’s executioner is not 
a prison employee, but “a private citizen who is paid $150 per execution” and 
whose identity is kept secret.67  
Execution protocols and state laws conceal execution procedures and 
participants’ identities.68 State laws prohibit disclosing the identities of 
 
meticulous watchmaker.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE 
PRISON 13 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1975) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH].  
 63 Fiero v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (N.D. Cal. 1994), vacated, Fierro v. 
Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 64 Id.  
 65 See BANNER, supra note 36, at 194–95; BRANDON, supra note 37, at 208–09, 220–
21 (discussing professional executioners).  
 66 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.10 (West 2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-10(2)–
(3) (West 2020) (allowing the executive director of corrections or a “designee” to select 
people to carry out lethal injection or “peace officers” to compose the firing squad); see also 
supra notes 28–37 and accompanying text (discussing historic internal executive delegation 
of killing). 
 67 Death Row, FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/deathrow.html 
[https://perma.cc/J5MX-DGJ2].  
 68 See KONRAD, BEHIND THE CURTAIN, supra note 24, at 14–16; Berger, Lethal 
Injection, supra note 5, at 1388–92; Deborah W. Denno, America’s Experiment with 
Execution Methods, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS 
ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 707, 721–24 
(James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm, & Charles S. Lanier eds., 3d ed. 2014).  
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execution team members69 or suppliers,70 and may exempt execution 
procedures from state freedom of information laws.71 Execution protocols track 
statutory secrecy and establish procedures to hide the execution team’s 
identities.72 Concealing executioners’ and suppliers’ identities shields them 
from possible negative consequences in their communities.73 It also serves 
symbolic functions. It is not the individual executioner who kills, but the 
embodiment of the state.74 
Other procedures shield executioners from knowing whether they were 
responsible for killing. A repealed New Jersey statute required the lethal 
 
 69 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757(C) (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-233 
(West 2020);TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.14(b) (West 2019); see also KONRAD, 
BEHIND THE CURTAIN, supra note 24, at 14–16; ROBERT JAY LIFTON & GREG MITCHELL, 
WHO OWNS DEATH?: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, AND THE END OF 
EXECUTIONS 88 (2000) (describing the secrecy surrounding executioners’ identities).  
 70 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-5-36(d)(2) (2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 
§ 1015(B) (West 2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (West 2020); see also KONRAD, BEHIND 
THE CURTAIN, supra note 24, at 14–16. 
 71 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617 (West 2020); see also KONRAD, BEHIND THE 
CURTAIN, supra note 24, at 14–16; LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION, supra note 4 (manuscript at 
42–45).  
 72 See, e.g., FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., EXECUTION BY ELECTROCUTION PROCEDURES 8–9 
(Feb. 27, 2019), http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/docs/Electrocution%20Certification%20Ltr% 
20and%20Procedure%202-27-19%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/DHD5-45BN] (describing 
a separate, secured “executioner’s room”); NORTH CAROLINA PROTOCOL, supra note 5, at 
16–17; OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR., EXECUTION 18 (Oct. 7, 2016), https://files. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/ExecutionProtocols/OhioProtocol10.07.2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RCX5-R69F] [hereinafter OHIO PROTOCOL]; VA. DEP’T OF CORR., 
EXECUTION MANUAL 10 (Feb. 7, 2017), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files 
/pdf/ExecutionProtocols/VirginiaProtocol02.07.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G6J-4TU3] 
[hereinafter VIRGINIA PROTOCOL]; see also Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy, supra note 5, 
at 1388–91.  
 73 See Motion for Leave to File and Brief for the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Applicants at 13, Barr v. Roane, No. 19A615 (Dec. 3, 2019) (“Without the 
assurance of confidentiality, ‘there is a significant risk that persons and entities necessary to 
the execution would become unwilling to participate.’”) (quoting Owens v. Hill, 758 S.E.2d 
794, 805 (Ga. 2014)); supra note 42 (discussing the historic unpopularity of executioners). 
There is a difference between legislative accountability and identifying members of an 
execution team. Nonetheless, the secrecy surrounding execution teams’ identities is one 
component of a multilayered and opaque system of extreme delegation and shifting 
responsibility. It should also be noted that there does not appear to have been any serious 
threats to execution teams or supplying pharmacies. See LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION, supra note 
4 (manuscript at 45–49) (discussing the absence of threats).  
 74 See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH, supra note 62, at 10 (“Those who carry out the 
penalty tend to become an autonomous sector; justice is relieved of responsibility for it by a 
bureaucratic concealment of the penalty itself.”); KAUFMAN-OSBORNE, supra note 35, at 200 
(describing executions as “another means of validating the state’s monopoly over the means 
of legitimate violence”); Osofsky et al., supra note 14, at 385 (discussing execution 
participants’ tendency to rely on “the societal imperative to use the death penalty as the 
ultimate punishment for homicidal crimes”).  
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injection protocol to ensure that the identity of the person who actually carried 
out the sentence would be concealed even from the executioner themselves.75 
Utah’s current statute requires “two or more persons . . . [to] administer a 
continuous intravenous injection,” but only one of those injections contains the 
lethal substances.76 These procedures may be intended to ameliorate 
executioners’ stress or trauma potentially caused by participation in an 
execution.77  
The lethal injection machine Fred Leuchter78 developed exemplified this 
principle.79 In The Execution Protocol, Stephen Trombley explains, “The basic 
design requirement . . . is that it should kill quickly and efficiently, and in a way 
that causes the least pain and distress to the condemned person, the executioners, 
and the witnesses.”80 The machine used two modules, one to deliver the drugs 
 
 75 N.J. STAT. Ann. § 2C:49-3 (West 2006), repealed by L. 2007, C. 204, § 7 (effective 
Dec. 18, 2007) (“[T]he procedures and equipment utilized in imposing the lethal substances 
shall be designed to insure that the identity of the person actually inflicting the lethal 
substance is unknown even to the person himself.”). The New Jersey Legislature abolished 
the death penalty in 2007. See New Jersey, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenalty 
info.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/new-jersey [https://perma.cc/U3ZF-XLX2]. 
 76 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-10 (West 2020).  
 77 See, e.g., JOHN D. BESSLER, KISS OF DEATH: AMERICA’S LOVE AFFAIR WITH THE 
DEATH PENALTY 115–16 (2003) [hereinafter BESSLER, KISS OF DEATH]; LIFTON & 
MITCHELL, supra note 69, at 89–90 (describing the impact on members of execution teams); 
Allen L. Ault, The Hidden Victims of the Death Penalty: Correctional Staff, WASH. POST 
(July 31, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/07/31/hidden-victims-
death-penalty-correctional-staff/ [https://perma.cc/74YW-G48V]; Jim Dwyer, Jim Dwyer of 
Newsday, Long Island, NY, NEWSDAY (Nov. 21, 1994), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners 
/jim-dwyer [https://perma.cc/P5YY-93CH] (click “Living with Those Deaths”); Jerry 
Givens, I Was Virginia’s Executioner from 1982 to 1999. Any Questions for Me?, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/21/death-penalty-
former-executioner-jerry-givens [https://perma.cc/NZS6-WPE5]; Robert T. Muller, Prison 
Executioners Face Job-Related Trauma, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/talking-about-trauma/201810/prison-execut 
ioners-face-job-related-trauma [https://perma.cc/57K4-QT6Z].  
 78 Fred Leuchter, once nicknamed “Dr. Death,” has been described as a “self-
proclaimed execution expert and manufacturer of death machinery,” despite lacking the 
qualifications to practice engineering. See An ‘Expert’ on Executions Is Charged With Fraud, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/24/us/an-expert-on-
executions-is-charged-with-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/6H9E-TSRQ]; see also STEPHEN 
TROMBLEY, THE EXECUTION PROTOCOL: INSIDE AMERICA’S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
INDUSTRY 84–86 (1992). Jurisdictions have since stopped using the machine. See Malcolm 
Gay, Uncomfortably Numb, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Dec. 15, 2004), https://www.riverfront 
times.com/stlouis/uncomfortably-numb/Content?oid=2482648 (on file with the Ohio 
State Law Journal). 
 79 See KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 35, at 181 (“The net result is a system that 
eliminates virtually all possibility of error while simultaneously perfecting the mechanisms 
that enable the dispersion and denial of responsibility for dealing death.”); see also BANNER, 
supra note 36, at 299; Dubber, supra note 14, at 563–66.  
 80 TROMBLEY, supra note 78, at 78–79.  
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and one to control the execution.81 The control module was in a different room 
than where the execution takes place, and required two members of the 
execution team to operate it.82 The module had “two complete sets of 
controls.”83 “When it was time for the execution to commence, each of the 
executioners presses a button. A computer in the machine chooses which 
executioner has activated the sequence, and the choice is then automatically 
erased from the computer’s memory.”84 
This method has both historic roots and modern applications. West 
Virginia’s electric chair was operated by pressing three buttons, but two were 
“dummies,” and “no one could be certain which button sent the current to the 
chair.”85 Japan currently uses comparable methods to conduct hangings; prison 
employees press buttons simultaneously, but “none is told which button is the 
‘live one’ that will cause the prisoner’s fall.”86 
Firing squad procedures also inject some doubt into who kills. Utah’s firing-
squad protocol requires a “five-person execution team,” with two alternates and 
a team leader.87 Four .30-caliber rifles are loaded with two rounds each, and the 
fifth with blanks.88 “Care shall be taken to preclude any knowledge by the 
members of the firing squad of who is issued the weapon with two blank 
cartridges.”89 This is a consistent practice in firing squads.90 It allows 
participants to reasonably claim they do not know if they killed the prisoner, 
 
 81 Id. at 79; Dubber, supra note 14, at 565–66.  
 82 TROMBLEY, supra note 78, at 79.  
 83 Id.  
 84 Id.  
 85 BRANDON, supra note 37, at 235.  
 86 Miwa Suzuki, Cruel Yet Popular Punishment: Japan’s Death Penalty, YAHOO NEWS 
(Sept. 7, 2018), https://sg.news.yahoo.com/cruel-yet-popular-punishment-japans-death-
penalty-044522392.html [https://perma.cc/7QVH-8C5C].  
 87 UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, TECHNICAL MANUAL 54, https://cdn. 
muckrock.com/foia_files/2017/03/22/3-13-17_MR34278_RES.pdf (on file with the Ohio 
State Law Journal) (revised June 10, 2010) [hereinafter UTAH PROTOCOL]; see also Denno, 
The Firing Squad, supra note 56, at 782–84 (describing Utah’s firing squad execution 
protocols).  
 88 UTAH PROTOCOL, supra note 87, at 88. 
 89 Id. at 88–89.  
 90 The 1959 Procedure for Military Executions requires eight members of a firing 
squad, and the officer in charge of carrying out the execution is responsible for ensuring that 
“[A]t least one, but no more than three will be loaded with blank ammunition.” DEP’T OF THE 
ARMY, PROCEDURE FOR MILITARY EXECUTIONS, AR 633–15, at 4 (Apr. 7, 1959) (rescinded). 
The officer is required to place the rifles at random in a rack so that the firing squad will not 
know which one they have selected. See id. Mississippi and Oklahoma permit the use of 
firing squads in executions. See Methods of Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/methods-of-execution [https://perma.cc/KB3M-
FZAM]; see also BANNER, supra note 36, at 203 (discussing historic firing squad protocols 
in Utah and Nevada that offered executioners the opportunity to disclaim responsibility for 
killing); supra note 57 and accompanying text.  
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although the odds are not in their favor.91 Corrections officials conceal the firing 
squad’s identities by placing the squad in a separate room from the prisoner they 
are about to kill.92  
Apart from mechanical interventions, execution protocols are “broken down 
into several small tasks, each assigned to a different person, to minimize the 
sense of responsibility felt by each participant.”93 Lethal injection protocols 
illustrate these processes.94 One individual orders the drugs.95 Another 
designated individual or team prepares the syringes.96 “Tie-down teams” or 
other correctional staff escort the condemned to the death chamber and strap 
him to the gurney.97 Montana’s protocols describe in detail which member of 
the tie-down team is responsible for each strap—different officers handle 
different straps, thus the condemned is tied down by a cohesive group, rather 
than an individual corrections officer.98 Another individual or team places the 
IVs.99 North Carolina’s execution team prepares the condemned in a 
“Preparation Room” by restraining him on the gurney, attaching “cardiac 
 
 91 See LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 69, at 89 (“This is ‘for the conscience of the 
executioners, so no one knows for sure who fired the live round,’ a spokesman for the 
corrections department in Utah has explained.”).  
 92 See UTAH PROTOCOL, supra note 87, at 89; see also NORMAN MAILER, THE 
EXECUTIONER’S SONG 1011 (1979).   
 93 BANNER, supra note 36, at 299; see Osofsky et al., supra note 14, at 386; see also 
LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 69, at 82 (“Individual responsibility also dissolves, as each 
member of the team is given only a limited task.”). 
 94 See FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., EXECUTION BY LETHAL INJECTION PROCEDURES 2–3 (Feb. 
2019), http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/docs/Lethal%20Injection%20Certification%20Ltr%20an 
d%20Procedure%202-27-19%20Final%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5X8-G6GW] [hereinafter 
FLORIDA LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL] (describing the different tasks the “team warden” 
assigns to various team members, including: “achieving and monitoring peripheral venous 
access,” “achieving and monitoring central venous access,” “examining the inmate prior to 
execution,” and “attaching the leads to the heart monitors and observing the monitors”); see 
also LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 69, at 81–82, 103–04 (discussing the “task-oriented” 
nature of executions).  
 95 See FLORIDA LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL, supra note 94, at 3; OHIO PROTOCOL, 
supra note 72, at 6.  
 96 See FLORIDA LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL, supra note 94, at 9; MONT. DEP’T OF 
CORR., MONTANA STATE PRISON EXECUTION TECHNICAL MANUAL 24, 50–51 (Jan. 16, 2013) 
(on file with the Ohio State Law Journal) [hereinafter MONTANA PROTOCOL]; OHIO 
PROTOCOL, supra note 72, at 12–13; UTAH PROTOCOL, supra note 87, at 77 (“The IV team 
leader shall prepare each chemical in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and 
draw them into the two (2) sets of syringes.”).  
 97 See MONTANA PROTOCOL, supra note 96, at 26; NORTH CAROLINA PROTOCOL, supra 
note 5, at 15; OHIO PROTOCOL, supra note 72, at 15.  
 98 MONTANA PROTOCOL, supra note 96, at 49.  
 99 See MONTANA PROTOCOL, supra note 96, at 50–51; NORTH CAROLINA PROTOCOL, 
supra note 5, at 9 (EMT-Paramedic is “responsible for the insertion of the catheters, IV lines, 
and applying of the leads of the EKG”); OHIO PROTOCOL, supra note 72, at 15 (“The Medical 
Team shall establish one or two viable IV sites[.]”); UTAH PROTOCOL, supra note 87, at 52, 
79–80 (IV Team).  
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monitoring electrodes,” inserting the IV, starting the saline solution, and 
covering the condemned with a sheet.100 Different team members bring the 
condemned into the “Death Chamber,” while other team members finalize the 
rest of the preparations.101 
The executioner administers the intravenous injections at the warden’s 
signal,102 often in a separate room than the death chamber.103 Another member 
of the execution team performs consciousness checks after an anesthetic is 
administered.104 If the condemned is unconscious, then the warden will signal 
the executioner who then administers the second and third drugs.105 Different 
members of the team may be responsible for monitoring different equipment or 
the prisoner’s bodily functions.106 Ohio has a “Command Center” keeping a 
record of the timeline of the prisoner’s death, and a “Drug Administrator”107 
announces “the start and finish times of each injection to the Command Center 
contact who shall then inform the Command Center for capture on the Execution 
Timeline.”108 
Compartmentalizing these actions into a series of mechanical, ritualized, 
and rehearsed steps separates obvious violence from killing.109 As Markus 
Dubber explains, because even participants in a system of capital punishment 
“share the general inhibition against inflicting extreme violence on a particular 
person, they develop mechanisms to minimize their sense of responsibility for 
the infliction of the death penalty.”110 If participants are guaranteed anonymity 
and take small, discreet actions, they can more readily disavow any sense of 
 
 100 NORTH CAROLINA PROTOCOL, supra note 5, at 15.  
 101 See id.  
 102 See MONTANA PROTOCOL, supra note 96, at 52; OHIO PROTOCOL, supra note 72, at 
16–18.  
 103 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 45 (2008) (“The execution team administers the drugs 
remotely from the control room through five feet of IV tubing.”); VIRGINIA PROTOCOL, supra 
note 72, at 10.  
 104 See MISSISSIPPI DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PROCEDURES 9 (Nov. 
2017), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/MississippiProtocol_11.15.20 
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5FT-9GP4] [hereinafter MISSISSIPPI PROCEDURES]; MONTANA 
PROTOCOL, supra note 96, at 52; VIRGINIA PROTOCOL, supra note 72, at 10. 
 105 See MONTANA PROTOCOL, supra note 96, at 52. This is in a state that uses a three-
drug protocol. See id. at 50–51. Some jurisdictions use single-drug execution protocols. See 
State by State Lethal Injection Protocols, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/lethal-injec tion/state-by-state-lethal-injection-
protocols [https://perma.cc/ULV9-9YBA] (illustrating six states that have recently used 
single-drug executions protocol). 
 106 See NORTH CAROLINA PROTOCOL, supra note 5, at 17–18; OHIO PROTOCOL, supra 
note 72, at 18. 
 107 Ohio’s protocols refer to the executioner as a “Drug Administrator.” See OHIO 
PROTOCOL, supra note 72, at 16–17. 
 108 Id. at 16, 18.  
 109 See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.  
 110 Dubber, supra note 14, at 562.  
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personal responsibility for killing another human being.111 External and 
retrospective sources of authority help maintain this façade: the state established 
the penalty, the jury sentenced him to death, the courts heard his appeals, and 
the warden gave the order.112  
Redirecting decisions about killing shifts accountability between 
individuals and entities. These practices echo legislative delegation to executive 
agencies. Nondelegation fits into this framework because it recognizes the 
inherent harms in shifting responsibility for consequential decisions. The next 
Part of this article discusses the role of the nondelegation doctrine in state and 
federal courts before turning in Part IV to a detailed discussion of inmates’ 
challenges to method of execution statutes.  
III. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 
The separation of powers is a core value in American governance. In 
Federalist No. 47, James Madison asserted that, to prevent tyranny, legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers must be divided, rather than accumulated by a 
branch, individual, or group.113 The nondelegation doctrine derives in part from 
this principle.114 Under the doctrine, a legislature may not delegate its “essential 
legislative functions” to other governmental bodies, such as administrative 
agencies.115 This Part begins with an examination of state nondelegation 
doctrines, followed by a discussion of Gundy v. United States,116 and the 
significance of the potential for a renewed federal nondelegation doctrine.  
A. State Nondelegation Doctrines 
The last time the Supreme Court found a legislative delegation 
impermissible under the nondelegation doctrine was in 1935.117 Since that time, 
 
 111 See supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also Osofsky et al., supra note 14, at 
386 (“After lethal activities become routinized into separate sub-functions, participants shift 
their attention from the morality of their activity to the operational details and efficiency of 
their specific job.”).  
 112 See BRANDON, supra note 37, at 209; LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 69, at 79, 105; 
Dubber, supra note 14, at 573.  
 113 James Madison, The Federalist No. 47, in ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, 
& JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 245, 245 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2009); 
see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996).  
 114 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989); KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6, at 1–2 (6th ed. supp. 2020).  
 115 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935); see also 
Loving, 517 U.S. at 757; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692–94 (1892); Rebecca L. Brown, 
Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1553–54 (1991). 
 116 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).  
 117 See id. at 2129; see also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 541–42 (“In 
view of the scope of that broad declaration and of the nature of the few restrictions that are 
imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting 
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the Supreme Court has consistently permitted Congress to make substantial 
delegations of powers to agencies and executive officials provided that 
Congress supplied an “intelligible principle” to guide the legislature’s 
discretion.118 For that reason, many scholars concluded that the nondelegation 
doctrine was mostly, if not completely dead.119 Others have suggested that 
courts could resurrect the nondelegation doctrine, even if in a slightly different 
form than it took in 1935.120 Still other scholarship points to interpretive canons 
 
laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually 
unfettered.”); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (“Congress has declared 
no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule.”); HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra 
note 114, at 5–6; William D. Araiza, Toward a Non-Delegation Doctrine That (Even) 
Progressives Could Like, in SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2018–2019, at 211, 216–17 (Steven 
D. Schwinn ed., 3d ed. 2019).  
 118 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (listing cases in which the Supreme Court permitted 
“very broad delegations”); see also ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 
153 (1987); HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 114, at 139, 143–46; DAVID SCHOENBROD, 
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH 
DELEGATION 40 (1993). A few lower courts have found unconstitutional delegations. See 
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1037–38 (D.C. Cir. 1999); South 
Dakota v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 885 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated, 519 
U.S. 919 (1996); see also Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of 
Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (1999) 
(asserting that the federal system “might be said to endorse a strong prodelegation separation 
of powers jurisprudence—one that generally favors delegation to administrative agencies, 
while precluding congressional delegation with strings attached”).    
 119 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 839 (1997); Andrew Coan & 
Nicholas Bullard, Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 VA. L. REV. 765, 780 (2016); 
Richard D. Cudahy, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Rumors of Its Resurrection Prove 
Unfounded, 16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1 (2002); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2364 (2001); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of 
the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1241 (1994); Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1723 (2002); 
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding 
the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 145 (2005); Alexander Volokh, The 
New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust 
Challenges, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 974 (2014).  
 120 See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 118, at 14; Larry Alexander & Saikrishna 
Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1328–29 (2003); Araiza, supra note 117, at 217; Peter H. Aranson, Ernest 
Gelhorn, & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 63 (1982); 
Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern 
Administrative State, 40 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 198 (2017); Cary Coglianese, 
Dimensions of Delegation, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1889 (2019); Jason Iuliano & Keith E. 
Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619, 
645 (2017); Bernard Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, 
The Laws, and Delegations of Power, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 459–60 (1977). 
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or reliance on other legal doctrines to apply nondelegation principles in federal 
cases.121 
Unlike the uncertainty in the viability of the federal nondelegation doctrine, 
as Jim Rossi has explained, in state courts, “the nondelegation doctrine is alive 
and well . . . .”122 Conceptually, state nondelegation doctrines are fairly similar 
to the federal nondelegation doctrine in that they stem from constitutional 
separation of powers principles. State systems of government parallel the 
tripartite federal system.123 Some state constitutions, like the U.S. Constitution, 
provide that each branch of government is vested with specific powers.124 
Others also have an express separation of powers clause and vesting clauses.125 
A handful of state constitutions, while preserving the division of powers, 
expressly permit delegation of “regulatory” authority in certain 
 
 121 HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 137–38 (2006) (asserting that courts have relied on the 
nondelegation doctrine “to justify narrowly construing a statute”); Aditya Bamzai, 
Comment, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and 
Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 174 (2019) (discussing Gundy v. 
United States); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Essay, Schecter Poultry at the Millennium: A 
Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1409 (2000); John F. 
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 699 (1997); 
John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 
223, 228; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreward, The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1181, 1197, 1203 (2018).  
 122 Rossi, supra note 118, at 1189. But see Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The 
Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 417 (2017) (observing that 
state courts are “surpris[ingly]” willing to defer to legislative delegation).  
 123 See, e.g., Brown v. Heymann, 297 A.2d 572, 577 (N.J. 1972) (“There is no indication 
that our State Constitution was intended, with respect to the delegation of legislative power, 
to depart from the basic concept of distribution of the powers of government embodied in 
the Federal Constitution.”).  
 124 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 2, § 1, art. 3, § 1, art. 4, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. 2, § 1, 
art. 3, § 1; art. 4, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. 3, § 1, art. 5, § 1, art. 6, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. 1, § 3, 
art. 2, § 1, art. 3, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. II, § 1, art. III, § 1, art. IV, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 
2, pts. 41–45, see pt. 2 art. 69; N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 1, art. 4, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1, 
art. III, § 5, art. IV, § 1; PA. CONST. ch. 2, § 2, ch. 2, § 3, ch. 2, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. 3, § 1, 
art. 4, § 1, art. 5, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1, art. III, § 2, art. IV, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 1, art. V, § 1, art. VII, § 2. 
 125 See ALA. CONST. art. III, § 42; ARIZ. CONST. art. III; ARK. CONST. art. 4, §§ 1–2; CAL. 
CONST. art. III, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. III; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, 
¶ 3; IDAHO CONST. art. II, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 3, § 1; IOWA CONST. 
art 3, § 1; KY. CONST. §§ 27–28; LA. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1–2; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX; 
MD. CONST. art. 8; ME. CONST. art. 3, §§ 1–2; MICH. CONST. art. 3, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. 3, 
§ 1; MISS. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1–2; MO. CONST. art. 2, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 1; N.D. 
CONST. art. XI, § 26; NEB. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1, cl. 1; N.J. CONST. 
art. 3, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. 3, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. 4, § 1; OR. CONST. art. III, § 1; R.I. 
CONST. art. V; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 26; S.D. CONST. art. II; TENN. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1–2; TEX. 
CONST. art. II, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. 5, § 1; VA. CONST. art. 3, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ 2–
5; W. VA. CONST. art. 5, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 2, § 1.  
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circumstances.126 There is, as Keith Whittington and Jason Iuliano have 
observed, significant textual support in state constitutions delineating the 
responsibilities of each branch and limiting legislative delegation.127 
Despite permitting substantial delegation, state courts do apply the 
doctrine.128 This may be because state governmental structure, needs, and 
policies are sufficiently distinct from the sprawling federal system that a more 
robust nondelegation inquiry is viable.129 Likewise, state systems may be “better 
equipped” to tackle excessive delegation.130 Internal mechanisms within states 
may provide for comprehensive judicial review, increased legislative oversight, 
or administrative review processes.131 Similarly, state constitutions are more 
amenable to change than the federal constitution, potentially altering separation 
of powers analyses.132 
State nondelegation cases emphasize the importance of adhering to 
separation of powers principles in decision-making.133 The federal 
nondelegation doctrine permits Congress to direct others to “fill up the details” 
in a statute provided Congress has “la[id] down by legislative act an intelligible 
principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to 
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative 
power.”134 State nondelegation doctrines rely on similar analyses. In evaluating 
 
 126 See CONN. CONST. art. 2, amended by Art. XVIII; NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1, cl. 2; VA. 
CONST. art. 3, § 1; see also OR. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing the legislature can establish 
an agency for budgetary control).  
 127 Whittington & Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 122, at 
416.  
 128 See 1 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 17 (1965) (discussing state 
courts’ willingness to strike down statutes with excessively broad delegations); ROBERT F. 
WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 571–72 (2d ed. 1993); Rossi, supra note 118, at 
1193; Whittington & Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 122, at 
417; see also Brown v. Heymann, 297 A.2d 572, 577 (N.J. 1972) (“[I]n our State the 
judiciary has accepted delegations of legislative power which probably exceed federal 
experience.”).  
 129 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 238–39 
(2009) (“Each of the states has its own, virtually unique, arrangements concerning the 
distribution of powers among and within the branches.”); Rossi, supra note 118, at 1170 
(“State courts sometimes reach different results than their federal counterparts in deciding 
issues of constitutional law because states are distinct institutions of governance, in terms of 
their sizes, decisionmaking structures, populations, and histories.”).   
 130 See COOPER, supra note 128, at 17–18 (discussing the difference between federal and 
state courts in checking administrative agencies).  
 131 See id. at 19.  
 132 See WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 
239–40; see also Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism 
Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1670–71 (2014).  
 133 See Dep’t of Bus. Regulation v. Nat’l Manufactured Hous. Fed’n, Inc. 370 So. 2d 
1132, 1135 (Fla. 1979); Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978).  
 134 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (quoting 
Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville, R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs of Clinton Cty., 1 Ohio St. 77, 
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whether delegation is consonant with state separation of powers principles, state 
courts, while acknowledging pragmatic governance concerns, draw the line at 
allowing agencies to create policy.135 “Flexibility by an administrative agency 
to administer a legislatively articulated policy is essential to meet the 
complexities of our modern society, but flexibility in administration of a 
legislative program is essentially different from reposing in an administrative 
body the power to establish fundamental policy.”136  
Separation of powers jurisprudence may be classified as either “formalist” 
or “functionalist.”137 A formalist approach relies on “bright-line rules designed 
to keep each branch within its sphere of power.”138 A functionalist approach 
centers on “whether an action of one branch interferes with one of the core 
functions of another.”139 States, as in the federal system, use both formalist and 
functionalist approaches in separation of powers questions.140 Rossi offers a 
helpful taxonomy of the various states’ separation of powers constitutional 
provisions and state approaches to nondelegation: “weak,” “strong,” and 
“moderate.”141  
“Strong” jurisdictions evaluating nondelegation cases analyze the 
legislature’s freedom to set policy and delegate against whether the agency’s 
actions are consistent with the underlying statutory policies and commands.142 
 
88 (Ohio 1852)); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (citing J.W. 
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).  
 135 See Clean Air Constituency v. Cal. State Air Res. Bd., 523 P.2d 617, 626 (Cal. 1974) 
(“An unconstitutional delegation of power occurs when the Legislature confers upon an 
administrative agency the unrestricted authority to make fundamental policy 
determinations.”); CEEED v. Cal. Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 
329 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (“Consequently, where the Legislature makes the fundamental 
policy decision and delegates to some other body the task of implementing that policy under 
adequate safeguards, there is no violation of the doctrine.”); Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 
372 So. 2d 913, 920 (Fla. 1978) (exploring the difference between setting policy and 
“fleshing out” an existing policy through regulation); Chapel v. Commonwealth, 89 S.E.2d 
337, 342 (Va. 1955) (concluding that legislative failure to declare “specific policy” or “fix 
any standard to direct and guide” an agency in making rules was an “invalid” delegation of 
legislative power); Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (Va. 1930) (“Government could 
not be efficiently carried on if something could not be left to the judgment and discretion of 
administrative officers to accomplish in detail what is authorized or required by law in 
general terms.”).  
 136 Askew, 372 So. 2d at 924.  
 137 See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 989, 997 (2006) [hereinafter Barkow, Separation of Powers]; Brown, supra note 115, 
at 1522–23.  
 138 Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at 997.  
 139 Brown, supra note 115, at 1527. 
 140 See WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at 
238.  
 141 See Rossi, supra note 118, at 1190–1201. 
 142 See Clean Air Constituency v. Cal. State Air Res. Bd., 523 P.2d 617, 628 (Cal. 1974) 
(concluding that there was no separation of powers problem because the agency could 
exercise its discretion on “reasons relating to the three primary goals” of the legislation); see 
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Virginia, for example, has defined “[c]onstitutionally sufficient policies” in 
delegation cases as “those ‘where the terms or phrases employed have a well 
understood meaning, and prescribe sufficient standards to guide the 
administrator.’”143 A key component of this analysis is the guidelines limiting 
agency discretion.144 Provided legislatures have set policies and sufficient 
guidelines by which agencies exercise their discretion, the legislatures can 
delegate to agencies the “‘power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which 
the policy and principles apply.’”145  
State courts prefer substantial guidelines from legislatures to facilitate 
judicial review of nondelegation challenges because courts are more readily able 
to assess whether the agency has complied with the will of the legislature.146 
“Weak” jurisdictions generally uphold broad delegations as long as 
adequate procedural safeguards are in place, and concentrate their analysis on 
administrative standards.147 Courts may conclude that judicial review or 
compliance with the state’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA) are sufficient 
 
also Rossi, supra note 118, at 1224 (“[S]tate courts adhering to a strong nondelegation 
doctrine trade off the potential efficiencies associated with delegation to guard against 
faction and ensure that the legislature, rather than agencies, makes key policy decisions.”). 
 143 Elizabeth River Crossings OpCo, LLC v. Meeks, 749 S.E.2d 176, 192 (Va. 2013) 
(quoting Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 448 S.E.2d 622, 624 (Va. 1994)).  
 144 See Clean Air Constituency, 523 P.2d at 626–27 (“To avoid such delegation, the 
Legislature must provide an adequate yardstick for the guidance of the administrative body 
empowered to execute the law.”); Cottrell v. City & Cty. of Denver, 636 P.2d 703, 709–10 
(Colo. 1981) (en banc); State v. Ellis, 799 N.W.2d 267, 289 (Neb. 2011) (“[W]here the 
Legislature has provided reasonable limitations and standards for carrying out the delegated 
duties, there is no unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.”); Brown v. Vail, 237 
P.3d 263, 269 (Wash. 2010) (en banc) (“The second requirement for proper legislative 
delegation is that adequate procedural safeguards be present for the promulgation of rules 
and to test their constitutionality once promulgated.”).  
 145 Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (Va. 1930) (quoting Mutual Film Corp. v. 
Ohio Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 239, 245 (1915)); see also Hous. Auth. of City of Dallas v. 
Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 79, 87 (Tex. 1940) (“The legislature may validly delegate the 
authority to find facts from the basis of which there is determined the applicability of the 
law; that is, an administrative body may be given the authority to ascertain conditions upon 
which an existing law may operate . . . .”); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Smit, 689 S.E.2d 679, 
687 (Va. 2010) (explaining that legislatures need not set out minutiae, but can delegate 
authority to create procedures for general standards).  
 146 See Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918–19 (Fla. 1978) (“When 
legislation is so lacking in guidelines that neither the agency nor the courts can determine 
whether the agency is carrying out the intent of the legislature in its conduct, then, in fact, 
the agency becomes the lawgiver rather than the administrator of the law.”); see also Bullock 
v. Calvert, 480 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1972) (comparing claimed authority of the Texas 
Secretary of State over state elections with what the Texas General Assembly had actually 
authorized).  
 147 Rossi, supra note 118, at 1191–92.  
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to check administrative discretion.148 For instance, in Brown v. Vail,149 
discussed in greater detail infra, the Washington Supreme Court identified 
compliance with Washington’s APA with an agency appeals process or judicial 
review as a necessary limitation on administrative discretion when assessing 
agency rules that may subject a person to “criminal sanctions.”150  
The final category in Rossi’s taxonomy, “moderate,” describes jurisdictions 
that “vary the degree of standards necessary depending on the subject matter of 
the statute or the scope of the statutory directive.”151 This approach appears to 
be more consistent with that taken by courts in evaluating nondelegation 
challenges to capital punishment statutes. As discussed infra, courts rely 
substantially on the presumption of agency expertise and the impracticality of 
requiring legislatures to develop detailed protocols.152 
B. Recent Developments in the Federal Nondelegation Doctrine 
Although the federal nondelegation doctrine is of limited utility in 
evaluating state constitutional law,153 recent developments merit some 
discussion. The Supreme Court’s current approach to legislative delegation 
tracks a functionalist approach, allowing Congress significant freedom in 
delegation, provided it has set out an intelligible principle.154 Administrative 
agencies exercise substantial discretion in implementing and enforcing laws.155  
While the Supreme Court has eschewed the nondelegation doctrine since 
1935, the nondelegation doctrine may be “slightly alive.”156 In Gundy v. United 
 
 148 See COOPER, supra note 128, at 17 (“[S]tate courts have inclined to the view that 
combination of legislative, prosecutory, and adjudicatory functions in a single agency will 
be countenanced where a practical necessity therefor exists, but only so long as workable 
checks and balances . . . exist to guard against abuses of administrative discretion.”). But see 
Rossi, supra note 118, at 1227 (observing that state judicial review of agency rulemaking is 
generally weaker than federal APA review). 
 149 Brown v. Vail, 237 P.3d 263 (Wash. 2010) (en banc).  
 150 Id. at 269–70.  
 151 Rossi, supra note 118, at 1198.  
 152 See infra Part IV.B.  
 153 See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 122, at 417.  
 154 See Brown, supra note 115, at 1553–54.  
 155 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019); Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693–94 (1892).  
The true distinction . . . is between the delegation of power to make the law, which 
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or 
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The 
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.  
Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville, R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs of Clinton Cty., 1 Ohio St. 77, 
88–89 (Ohio 1852). 
 156 See THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Act III Communications 1987) (Miracle Max: “Well, it 
just so happens that your friend here is only mostly dead. There’s a big difference between 
mostly dead and all dead. . . . mostly dead is slightly alive”).  
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States, the Court held that the federal Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (SORNA) did not violate the nondelegation doctrine by 
granting the Attorney General discretion to apply SORNA’s sex offender 
registration requirements to individuals convicted of sex offenses before 
SORNA was enacted.157 Nonetheless, two separate opinions for four members 
of the Court signaled a potential shift in the Court’s approach to 
nondelegation.158 Justice Alito concurred only in the judgment, and expressed 
his willingness to reevaluate the nondelegation doctrine.159 Justice Gorsuch, 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, dissented on the ground 
that SORNA effectively permitted the Attorney General to write the law that 
would apply to individuals convicted before SORNA was enacted.160  
Justice Gorsuch asserted that the “intelligible principle misadventure”161 
had obscured “guiding principles” the Court had previously set forth to channel 
courts’ analyses of separation of powers cases.162 First, Congress may direct 
another branch of government to “fill up the details” provided that “Congress 
makes the policy decisions . . . .”163 This required Congress to identify 
“standards ‘sufficiently definite and precise’” to permit Congress, the people, 
and the judicial branch to determine whether the branch authorized to “fill up 
the details” had complied with Congress’s directives.164 Second, Congress is 
permitted to make application of a rule contingent on specific fact-finding by 
the executive.165 Third, in examining whether a statute impermissibly delegates 
legislative power, a court must consider whether there is an overlap between 
Congress’s exclusive legislative authority and a power the Constitution has 
vested in another branch of government.166  
Justice Gorsuch reframed the intelligible principle inquiry against these 
principles:  
 
 157 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129–30. 
 158 See Bamzai, supra note 121, at 166.  
 159 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If a majority of 
this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I 
would support that effort.”).   
 160 Id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 161 Id. at 2141.  
 162 Id. at 2136–39.  
 163 Id. at 2136 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 31, 43 (1825)).   
 164 Id.; see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944); In re Kollock, 165 
U.S. 526, 532 (1897); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 31 (1825).  
 165 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Cargo of Brig Aurora v. 
United States, 11 U.S. 382, 388 (1813), and Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U.S. 385, 
393 (1883)). The absence of controlled (or indeed any) fact-finding was one of the factors 
that proved fatal to the relevant provision of the NIRA in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 
U.S. 388, 415 (1935) (“It does not require any finding by the President as a condition of his 
action.”).  
 166 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Loving v. United States, 517 
U.S. 748, 772 (1996) (discussing an overlap between a delegation of authority to set 
aggravating factors in a capital trial for the military and the President’s role as Commander 
in Chief); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).  
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Does the statute assign to the executive only the responsibility to make factual 
findings? Does it set forth the facts that the executive must consider and the 
criteria against which to measure them? And most importantly, did Congress, 
and not the Executive Branch, make the policy judgments? Only then can we 
fairly say that a statute contains the kind of intelligible principle the 
Constitution demands.167 
He characterized the separation of powers doctrine as a “procedural 
guarantee that requires Congress to assemble a social consensus before choosing 
our nation’s course on policy questions . . . .”168 Respecting these limitations 
protects individual rights,169 and promotes legislative accountability.170  
In evaluating the distinctions between Justice Kagan’s majority opinion and 
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, Aditya Bamzai asserts that this analysis measures the 
same factors in the Court’s traditional “intelligible principle” analysis; thus the 
“real difference” is the level of scrutiny the Court might apply to that analysis.171 
Although there is similarity between the analyses, the potential for increased 
scrutiny is a significant development in reevaluating the doctrine.172  
Justice Kavanaugh did not participate in Gundy, and the Court recently 
denied Gundy’s petition for rehearing.173 Even so, the Court can likely count 
five members who are willing to reconsider the scope of legislative delegation. 
In a statement regarding denial of certiorari in a case that raised the same issues 
as Gundy, Justice Kavanaugh signaled his willingness to reevaluate the scope of 
the nondelegation doctrine, particularly Congress’s authority to delegate “major 
policy questions” to agencies.174 A significant alteration of the federal 
nondelegation doctrine, therefore, may be in the cards.175  
 
 167 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141.  
 168 Id. at 2145.  
 169 See id. at 2131.  
 170 See id. at 2134.  
 171 Bamzai, supra note 121, at 185; see also Coglianese, supra note 120, at 1883 
(asserting that Justice Gorsuch’s dissent does not offer more meaningful guidance than the 
intelligible principle test).  
 172 See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 117, at 231–34; Coglianese, supra note 120, at 1883; 
Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 718, 817 (2019); Sophia Z. Lee, 
Our Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism From the Founding to the 
Present, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1699, 1747 (2019); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical 
Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 912 (2020); F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa 
Byrne Hessick, Nondelegation and Criminal Law, 107 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 6) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).  
 173 Gundy v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 579 (mem.) (2019).  
 174 Paul v. United States, 718 Fed.App’x. 360 (6th Cir. 2017) (Statement of Kavanaugh, 
J., respecting the denial of certiorari), cert denied, 140 S. Ct. 342 (Nov. 25, 2019) (No. 17–
8330). 
 175 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, “I’m Leavin’ It (All) Up To You”: Gundy and the (Sort-Of) 
Resurrection of the Subdelegation Doctrine, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, 33 (2018–19); 
supra note 161.  
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This development is significant insofar as it informs the application of state 
nondelegation doctrines and provides a possible way to reframe the debate over 
delegation in capital punishment.176 Regardless of the strength or weakness of 
a state’s approach to delegation, state courts generally reject inmates’ claims 
that states’ highly generalized method of execution statutes violate the 
nondelegation doctrine.  
IV. NONDELEGATION CHALLENGES TO METHOD OF  
EXECUTION STATUTES 
All twenty-eight states that retain the death penalty use lethal injection as 
their primary method of execution.177 Although some states only use lethal 
injection,178 others offer prisoners a choice between two or even three 
 
 176 In Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 935-37 (Wis. 2020), Justice 
Kelly’s concurrence expressly discussed Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent in state separation 
of powers questions along with Wisconsin precedent. Id. (Kelly, J., concurring). Gundy 
could potentially support states’ decisions to apply a more skeptical evaluation of state 
legislative delegation. 
 177 See ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(a) (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757(A) (2020); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(a), (c) (2020); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(a) (West 2020); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 922.105(1) (West 2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-38(a) (West 2020); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 19-2716 (West 2020); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-6-1(a) (West 2020); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(a) (West 2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220(1)(a) (West 2020); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:569(B) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51(1) (West 2020); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 546.720(1) (West 2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(3) (West 2019); NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-964 (West 2020); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.355(1) (West 2020); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15-188 (West 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2949.22(A) (West 
2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014(A) (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.473(1) 
(West 2020); 61 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a)(1) (West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 23A-27A-32 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-114(a) (West 2020); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.14(a) (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5(1)(a) (West 
2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (West 2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-904(a) (West 
2020). Pennsylvania, California, and Oregon all have governor-imposed moratoriums. See 
Mark Berman, Pennsylvania’s Governor Suspends the Death Penalty, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/02/13/pennsylvania-
suspends-the-death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/BYW5-3MXN]; J. Cooper, Oregon’s New 
Governor Plans to Continue Death Penalty Moratorium, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Feb. 
23, 2015), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/oregons-new-governor-plans-to-continue-
death-penalty-moratorium [https://perma.cc/T22A-KTH3]; Innocence Staff, California 
Governor Imposes Death Penalty Moratorium, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/ca-gov-imposes-death-penalty-moratorium/ [https:// 
perma.cc/4L3Z-9MQX]. 
 178 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-38(a); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2716; IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 35-38-6-1(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(3); NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-964; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.355(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15-
188; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.22(A); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.473(1); PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a)(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-32; TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 43.14(a).  
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methods.179 Inmates in Alabama can choose between lethal injection, 
electrocution, or nitrogen hypoxia.180 In Virginia and Florida, inmates may 
select electrocution or lethal injection; lethal injection is the default if a prisoner 
refuses to choose.181 California grants inmates a choice of lethal injection or 
gas.182 Some jurisdictions, like Tennessee and Arizona, only give inmates 
whose offenses were committed before a certain date a choice between two 
methods.183 Some states have authorized alternative methods of execution in the 
event that lethal injection is unavailable due to drug shortages or court 
rulings.184 Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Utah have authorized the firing squad as 
 
 179 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757(B); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 3604(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.105(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-530 (2020); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234. Three states, Washington, New Hampshire, and Delaware all 
authorize hanging, but none of those jurisdictions retain the death penalty. See Rauf v. State, 
145 A.3d 430, 433–34 (Del. 2016) (concluding that Delaware’s death penalty was 
unconstitutional because it permitted a judge to determine the facts necessary to impose a 
death sentence and did not require juror unanimity); State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 621–22 
(Wash. 2018) (holding that Washington’s death penalty was unconstitutional under 
Washington’s Constitution because it was administered in an arbitrary and racially biased 
manner); Kate Taylor & Richard A. Oppel Jr., New Hampshire, with a Death Row of 1, Ends 
Capital Punishment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11 
/us/death-penalty-new-hampshire.html [https://perma.cc/SYY2-ATDH]. 
 180 ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(a)–(b).  
 181 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.105(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234.  
 182 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(a).  
 183 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757(B) (2020) (“A defendant who is sentenced to 
death for an offense committed before November 23, 1992 shall choose either lethal injection 
or lethal gas at least twenty days before the execution date.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 431.220(1)(a) (West 2020) (giving prisoners who were sentenced to death before March 
31, 1998 a choice between lethal injection or electrocution); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-
114(b) (West 2020) (“Any person who commits an offense prior to January 1, 1999, for 
which the person is sentenced to the punishment of death may elect to be executed by 
electrocution by signing a written waiver waiving the right to be executed by lethal 
injection.”). If an inmate refuses to choose, statutes identify a “default” method, which is 
usually lethal injection. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-
114; VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234. 
 184 See ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.105(3); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 99-19-51(1) (West 2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1014(C) (West 2020); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 24-3-530; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-114(d). States have complained about 
difficulties in sourcing lethal injection drugs due to anti-death penalty activists and 
pharmaceutical companies’ unwillingness to allow their products to be used in executions. 
See, e.g., Ty Alper, The United States Execution Drug Shortage: A Consequence of Our 
Values, 21 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 27, 29–31, 33–35 (2014); Lincoln Caplan, The End of the 
Open Market for Lethal-Injection Drugs, NEW YORKER (May 21, 2016), https://www.new 
yorker.com/news/news-desk/the-end-of-the-open-market-for-lethal-injection-drugs 
[https://perma.cc/5R86-VZYK]; Jolie McCullough, How Many Doses of Lethal Injection 
Drugs Does Texas Have?, TEX. TRIB., https://apps.texastribune.org/execution-drugs/ 
[https://perma.cc/NA2T-9FE9] (last updated July 3, 2020). 
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a method of execution.185 Some statutes have a “catch-all” clause permitting 
Departments of Corrections to choose any constitutional method if all the 
legislatively-authorized methods are found unconstitutional or are otherwise 
unavailable.186  
Most of these statutes do not contain substantial detail beyond the method 
of execution the legislature selected. Lethal injection statutes rely on general 
reference to “lethal injection,”187 or “the administration of a lethal quantity of a 
drug or drugs”188 “by an intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a 
lethal quantity sufficient to cause death.”189 Legislatures usually leave it to the 
state’s department of corrections to develop protocols and make critical 
decisions.190 A handful of jurisdictions have designated classes of drugs, or 
specific drugs, to be used in lethal injections, such as anesthetics, barbiturates, 
chemical paralytic agents, potassium chloride, or sodium thiopental.191 Statutes 
designating other methods of execution are similarly general, referring to 
“electrocution,”192 “firing squad,”193 “lethal gas,”194 or “hanging,” and granting 
the state’s department of corrections substantial decision-making authority.195  
Most method of execution statutes rarely address pain in the execution 
process. The few statutes that do refer to pain typically offer general statements 
 
 185 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014(D) (providing that if lethal injection, nitrogen 
hypoxia, and electrocution are unconstitutional or “otherwise unavailable, then the sentence 
of death shall be carried out by firing squad”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51(4) (alternative 
if lethal injection, nitrogen hypoxia, and electrocution are unconstitutional or unavailable); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5(3) (West 2012).  
 186 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.105(3); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2949.22(C) (West 2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-114(d). 
 187 See ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(a). 
 188 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014(A).  
 189 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757(A) (2020); see also CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 3604(a) (West 2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(a) (West 2020); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 43.14(a) (West 2019).  
 190 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(c); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-964 (West 2020); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.355 (West 2020); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.14(a); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (West 2020); see also Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem 
of Constitutional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 259, 303 (2009) (discussing state 
statutes that direct substantial discretion to agencies).  
 191 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(c) (2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51(1) (West 2020); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 137.473(1) (West 2020); PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a)(1) 
(West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-10(2) (West 2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-904(a) 
(West 2020); see also infra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 192 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.  
 193 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5(3).  
 194 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757(B); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(a). Alabama, 
Oklahoma, and Mississippi specifically identify “nitrogen hypoxia” as the method of 
execution for gas. See ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(a) (2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51(2); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014(B) (West 2020).  
 195 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 546.720 (West 2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-530 
(2020).  
2020] NONDELEGATING DEATH 951 
that drugs should “quickly and painlessly cause death,”196 or “cause death in a 
swift and humane manner.”197  
Inmates’ nondelegation challenges to state method of execution statutes 
contend that the grant of broad discretion to the department of corrections to 
create execution protocols lacks a sufficient intelligible principle or policy 
determination and represents an unconstitutional delegation of pure legislative 
power.198 Even states using “strong” nondelegation approaches, such as Florida 
and Texas,199 have rejected these arguments.200 Arkansas is the sole jurisdiction 
to have concluded that its method of execution statute represented an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.201  
This Part recounts previous nondelegation challenges to death penalty 
litigation. Part A centers on the litigation in Arkansas in Jones that found a 
separation of powers violation. Part B examines litigation in other jurisdictions 
that upheld broad delegation to correctional agencies to create protocols. 
A. The Arkansas Method of Execution Act and Nondelegation 
In 2010, a group of death row inmates in Arkansas challenged the 
constitutionality of the Arkansas Method of Execution Act (AMEA).202 They 
asserted that the AMEA violated the Arkansas Constitution’s separation of 
powers doctrine because it unconstitutionally delegated the Arkansas 
Department of Correction (ADC) “unfettered discretion” to select lethal 
injection chemicals and other execution-related policies.203 The AMEA selected 
“intravenous lethal injection” of “one . . . or more chemicals, as determined in 
kind and amount in the discretion of the Director of the Department of 
Correction” as the state’s method of execution.204 It provided a list the director 
could choose from, including “ultra-short-acting barbiturates,” “chemical 
paralytic agents,” “[p]otassium chloride,” as well as “[a]ny other chemical or 
chemicals . . . .”205 The circuit court found the AMEA unconstitutional and 
struck the catch-all phrase.206  
 
 196 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2949.22(A) (2020).  
 197 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(a) (2020); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51(1).  
 198 Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 854 (Ark. 2012).  
 199 See Rossi, supra note 118, at 1193–95.  
 200 See Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by 
Darling v. State, 45 So.3d 444 (Fla. 2010); see also Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.3d 503, 514 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc). 
 201 See Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at 854; see also infra Part III.A. 
 202 Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at at 847. 
 203 Id. at 847–50.   
 204 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–4–617(a)(1) (West 2011).  
 205 Id. § 5–4–617(a)(2).  
 206 Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at 849.  
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The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed and struck the entire statute as 
facially unconstitutional because it was not severable.207 Arkansas’s legislature 
may delegate discretionary authority to other branches, such as the power to 
determine facts or to act in response to a contingency the statute identifies.208 
Provided the law was “mandatory in all it requires and all it determines,”209 it 
did not violate separation of powers principles if the legislature designated 
certain state officials or agencies to put the law into operation.210 The legislature 
had to enact “appropriate standards by which the administrative body is to 
exercise th[e delegated] power” before delegating discretionary power to an 
agency or official.211 But, the court cautioned, “[a] statute that, in effect, reposes 
an absolute, unregulated, and undefined discretion in an administrative agency 
bestows arbitrary powers and is an unlawful delegation of legislative 
powers.”212  
The court concluded that the AMEA gave ADC the “absolute discretion” to 
determine the kind and amount of chemicals to be used for lethal injection, 
without offering any guidance in selecting the chemicals.213 The AMEA did not 
create a mandatory directive—ADC could choose (or decline) to use any of the 
listed drugs.214 While the legislature could give ADC the power to make factual 
determinations or decisions in contingencies, the AMEA “g[ave] the ADC the 
power to decide all the facts and all the contingencies with no reasonable 
guidance given absent the generally permissive use of one or more 
chemicals.”215 Coupled with ADC’s unlimited discretion to set all policies and 
procedures to conduct executions, there was “no guidance and no general policy 
with regard to the procedures for the ADC to implement lethal injections.”216 
 
 207 Id. at 855. The circuit court apparently reasoned that the reference to “any other 
chemical or chemicals” would eliminate much of the uncertainty in the statute. Id. at 849. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the language the circuit court struck did not 
have a “practical effect” on the statute because the remainder of the statute gave the ADC 
“absolute discretion.” Id. at 855. 
 208 Id. at 851 (citing State v. Davis, 10 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Ark. 1928)).  
 209 State v. Davis, 10 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Ark. 1928).  
 210 Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Ark. 2012) (quoting State v. Davis, 10 S.W.2d 
513, 514 (Ark. 1928)); see also Ark. Sav. & Loans Ass’n Bd. v. West Helena Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 538 S.W.2d 560, 564–67 (Ark. 1976)). 
 211 Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at 852.  
 212 Id.  
 213 Id. at 853–54 (noting that “may” is discretionary and observing that “the list of 
chemicals is not exhaustive and includes, as an option, broad language that ‘any other 
chemical or chemicals’ may be used” (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(a)(2)(D) (Supp. 
2011))). Before the 2009 amendments, the AMEA provided that “[t]he punishment of death 
is to be administered by a continuous intravenous injection of a lethal quality of an ultra-
short-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent until the defendant’s 
death is pronounced according to accepted standards of medical practice.” ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-4-617 (repealed 2009).  
 214 Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at 854. 
 215 Id. at 854.  
 216 Id.  
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The court also declined to read the prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment 
in the Arkansas and U.S. Constitutions as “reasonable guidance” for ADC.217 
The General Assembly’s failure to provide specific guidance in statutes violated 
the separation of powers “and other constitutional provisions cannot provide a 
cure.”218 
The Jones dissent grounded its objection in majoritarian perspectives: every 
other nondelegation case had reached the opposite conclusion, and many other 
states’ method of execution statutes gave departments of corrections even 
broader discretion to select lethal injection drugs and carry out executions.219 
Like other states, discussed infra, the dissent concluded it was sufficient for the 
AMEA to define the punishment and express the legislature’s intent to impose 
that punishment.220 Granting ADC the discretion to figure out the methodology 
and chemicals was appropriate because ADC was “better qualified” to make the 
decision and it was “impracticable” for the General Assembly to do it.221  
After Jones, the Arkansas Legislature amended the AMEA in 2013, 
adopting a single-drug barbiturate protocol that also required ADC to administer 
a benzodiazepine222 to the inmate before initiating the execution.223 Inmates 
again brought nondelegation claims, including allegations that the amended 
AMEA did not constrain ADC’s discretion in drug administration, selection, 
and training members of the execution team.224 When that case, Hobbs v. 
 
 217 Id.  
 218 Id.  
 219 See id. at 858–60 (Baker, J., dissenting). The dissent also relied on the Eighth 
Circuit’s conclusion in Nooner v. Norris, 594 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2010), that Arkansas’s 
lethal-injection protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment in part because it was 
consistent with the three-drug protocol that other states used. See Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at 861 
(Baker, J., dissenting); see also Nooner, 594 F.3d at 601, 608. 
 220 Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at 861 (Baker, J., dissenting).  
 221 Id. (“The execution of this law is precisely the type of delegation of ‘details with 
which it is impracticable for the legislature to deal directly.’”) (quoting Leathers v. Gulf Rice 
Ark., Inc., 994 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Ark. 1999).  
 222 Benzodiazepines are a class of “[C]entral [N]ervous [S]ystem depressants 
that . . . [have] sedative, and muscle-relaxing properties.” What Are Central Nervous System 
Depressants?, ADDICTION CTR., https://www.addictioncenter.com/drugs/drug-classifica 
tions/central-nervous-system-depressants/#:~:text=Sometimes%20called%20%E2%80%9 
Cbenzos%2C%E2%80%9D%20benzodiazepines,Valium%2C%20Xanax%2C%20and%20
Ativan [https://perma.cc/MUQ5-424W]. The ADC described benzodiazepines as “a class of 
drugs known for their anti-anxiety and anticonvulsant properties.” Hobbs v. McGehee, 458 
S.W.3d 707, 716 n.5 (Ark. 2015). 
 223 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(b) (West 2013); S.B. 237, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. § 1 (Ark. 2013). The Arkansas General Assembly has amended the statute two more 
times since then. See S.B. 464, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ark. 2019); H.B. 1751, 
90th Gen. Assemb, Reg. Sess. §§ 1–2 (Ark. 2015). The amendments changed the type of 
drugs that could be used in an execution but require ADC to choose between a single-drug 
or three-drug protocol based on drug availability. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(c).  
 224 McGehee, 458 S.W.3d at 710. 
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McGehee,225 reached the Arkansas Supreme Court, the court reversed course 
from Jones.226  
Designating barbiturates as the lethal agent channeled ADC’s discretion 
because the legislature could constitutionally grant an agency the power to select 
from “specific legislatively approved options.”227 The legislature had crafted a 
more precise set of directives for executions and given ADC a targeted mandate 
to develop regulations surrounding capital punishment.228 The court relied on 
Baze v. Rees,229 to conclude that the amended AMEA did not need to set training 
and qualifications for execution teams.230 In Baze, inmates contended that 
inadequate facilities and training created a risk that execution teams would 
improperly administer thiopental, causing severe pain.231 The Supreme Court 
relied on the trial court’s factual findings that it was easy to follow directions to 
prepare the drug, and that the execution protocol set qualifications for 
executioners in concluding that Kentucky’s protocol did not risk severe pain.232 
McGehee’s willingness to mix Eighth Amendment holdings with separation of 
powers analyses may be explained by the authoring justice, who had dissented 
in Jones in part because she thought constitutional principles prohibiting cruel 
and unusual punishments narrowed agency discretion.233 
The transition from Jones to McGehee can be explained in part by the 
amendments to the AMEA, which addressed some of the court’s criticisms in 
Jones by setting mandatory standards and more specific criteria for execution 
protocols.234 But the McGehee dissent contended that identifying classes of 
drugs alone did not provide reasonable guidelines because of variability in drug 
onset and length of effect.235 The McGehee majority, by contrast, was more 
willing to credit agency expertise and resume a majoritarian position in the 
context of the death penalty and nondelegation.236  
 
 225 458 S.W.3d 707 (Ark. 2015).  
 226 Id. at 718.  
 227 Id. at 716–17 (“Here, the legislature has afforded reasonable guidelines by limiting 
the ADC’s discretion to barbiturates, rather than permitting the ADC to consider any drug 
of any class.”). 
 228 Id. at 717.  
 229 Id. at 718 (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 45 (2008)).  
 230 McGehee, 458 S.W.3d at 718 (citing Hooker v. Parkin, 357 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Ark. 
1962)). 
 231 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 54 (2008). 
 232 Id. at 54–55.  
 233 See Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 861 (Ark. 2012) (Baker, J., dissenting) 
(“[A]ppellants’ discretion is not ‘unfettered’ because they are at all times bound by the 
constraints of our federal and state constitutions against cruel and unusual punishment.”). 
 234 See supra note 223 (discussing amendments to the AMEA).  
 235 McGehee, 458 S.W.3d at 721 (Wynne, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Ultra-short-acting barbiturates can cause a person to lose consciousness within seconds, 
while a long-acting barbiturate may take considerably longer to take effect.”).  
 236 See Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 17; Corinna Barrett 
Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards”, 57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 413–14 
(2009). 
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B. Nondelegation Challenges to Method of Execution Statutes 
Ex parte Granviel, decided in 1978, is the earliest case in which an inmate 
raised a nondelegation claim.237 Texas’s lethal injection statute, enacted in 
1977, called for execution by “intravenous injection of a substance or substances 
in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death and until such convict is dead,” to 
be “determined and supervised by the Director of the Department of 
Corrections.”238 Granviel asserted that this broad provision gave the director 
legislative authority in violation of the Texas Constitution.239  
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged the legislature’s 
responsibility to “declar[e] a policy and fix[] a primary standard” before giving 
the power to an agency to “establish rules, regulations, or minimum standards 
reasonably necessary to carry out the expressed purpose of the act.”240 It 
concluded that, by choosing the death penalty, selecting a method and time of 
execution, and designating someone to set execution procedure, the legislature 
had sufficiently cabined the director’s discretion.241 The court afforded 
significant deference to the legislature’s decision to delegate, and the director’s 
presumed expertise in addressing details that the legislature could not 
“practically or efficiently” do itself.242 
Granviel also connected the regularity of administrative procedures to the 
question of delegation.243 Although at that time lethal injection was a brand-
new method of execution, the court relied on a vaguely worded affidavit from 
the director to conclude that his choice of drugs was “informed.”244 The 
director’s assertion that he had consulted with “people familiar with lethal 
substances”245 in making his decision showed his compliance with the “basic 
principle” of administrative law to “ascertain[] facts to support the final choice 
of the substance,” despite an absence of any real detail on how he had made that 
choice.246  
Granviel became the template for nondelegation claims that followed. Like 
the Jones dissent, courts relied on Granviel to conclude nondelegation was not 
viable.247 For example, in State v. Osborn, the Idaho Supreme Court observed, 
 
 237 Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc). 
 238 H.B. No. 945, 65th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Tex. 1977).  
 239 Granviel, 561 S.W.2d at 514.  
 240 Id.  
 241 Id. at 515. 
 242 Id.  
 243 See id. at 514 
 244 Id. at 515; id. at 507–08 (quoting the complete affidavit); see also BANNER, supra 
note 36, at 297. 
 245 Granviel, 561 S.W.2d at 508.  
 246 Id. at 515.  
 247 Zink v. Lombardi, No. 2:12-cv-4209-NKL, 2012 WL 12828155, at *6 (W.D. Mo. 
Nov. 16, 2012); Sims v. Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 308–09 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); Sims 
v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 668–69 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam); State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 
201 (Idaho 1981); State v. Ellis, 799 N.W.2d 267, 289, 289 nn.51–52 (Neb. 2011). 
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“This matter was disposed of in Ex parte Granviel,” quoted the opinion at 
length, and concluded it, too, would assume its director of corrections would 
behave reasonably without analyzing Idaho’s separation of powers doctrine.248  
Other jurisdictions, including Florida, Nebraska, California, Arizona, and a 
federal district court in Missouri, have placed heavy reliance on other 
nondelegation decisions, although they typically offer more legal analysis than 
Osborn.249 This kind of approach is common in state constitutional law and 
death penalty jurisprudence. Courts rely on statistics on, inter alia, judicial 
decisions in capital sentencing to show “reliable objective evidence of 
contemporary values” to evaluate whether a punishment comports with 
“evolving standards of decency.”250 It can also be seen from courts’ reliance on 
the Supreme Court’s preemptive approval of the Baze three-drug protocol for 
other states’ execution protocols.251 If enough states seem to have adopted a 
particular method, courts tend to accept it—and an accompanying broad 
delegation—more readily, without assessing particular agencies’ internal 
decision-making.252 Eric Berger observes that the use of “state counting” in 
evaluating the permissibility of execution protocols in Baze is “exceedingly 
deferential” without considering whether “state practices should be 
probative.”253  
When it comes to evaluating the constitutional scope of legislative 
delegation to agencies, courts, perhaps wary of imposing countermajoritarian 
decisions on legislative action, do not consider whether state legislatures’ broad 
delegations undermine important democratic values and instead rely on 
numbers.254 Rossi criticizes this approach because courts often fail to address 
distinctions between other jurisdictions’ governmental and constitutional 
structure and their own.255 Courts’ reliance on the Granviel line of precedent 
 
 248 Osborn, 631 P.2d at 201.  
 249 See, e.g., Zink, 2012 WL 12828155, at *6–8; Ellis, 799 N.W.2d at 289, 289 nn.51–
52; Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1056 n.4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012); Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
at 308–09; Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam); Sims, 754 So. 2d 
at 668–69 (per curiam).  
 250 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330–31 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–67 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16 (2002); 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789–93 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593–96 
(1977).   
 251 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 61 (2008) (“A State with a lethal injection protocol 
substantially similar to the protocol we uphold today would not create a risk that meets this 
standard.”); see also Nooner v. Norris, 594 F.3d 592, 597, 599, 601, 608 (8th Cir. 2010); 
Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 13 (discussing “preemptive 
deference”).  
 252 See Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 17. 
 253 Id.   
 254 See id. at 14. 
 255 See Rossi, supra note 118, at 1233 (“In many state cases, separation of powers 
analysis becomes a counting game—a “me[]-tooism”—where a court simply cites the 
number of state opinions accepting a certain type of statute and the number rejecting it, 
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leads them to rapidly dismiss Jones without assessing if their separation of 
powers doctrines are more similar to Arkansas or to other states’ doctrines.256  
In determining whether legislatures have established sufficient policy, most 
courts conclude that legislatures have complied by adopting the penalty and 
picking a general method of execution, and occasionally, by identifying the 
agency or official to create the protocol or carry out the execution.257 One 
difficulty with this analysis is that courts sometimes conflate one policy decision 
(whether a particular crime merits the death penalty) with another (the method 
of execution).  
Sims v. Kernan illustrates this problem. The California Court of Appeals 
suggested that the legislature had spent sufficient time on policy decisions to 
guide the corrections agency because it had addressed other aspects of the death 
penalty, such as capital trial procedure; the location of death row; allowing the 
inmate to choose between lethal gas and lethal injection; identifying witnesses; 
and voluntary physician attendance.258 Sims did not clarify how these decisions 
set standards an agency could use to evaluate whether it had complied with the 
legislative policy when it selected lethal drugs or gas for executions—or if these 
enactments could guide agency decision-making about pain.  
To overcome this hurdle, courts have relied on state or federal constitutional 
requirements to constrain agency discretion.259 In Cook v. State, the Arizona 
 
usually as support for siding with the majority of states having previously considered the 
issue.”) (footnote omitted); see also John P. Frank, Book Review, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1339, 
1340 (1985) (reviewing Developments in State Constitutional Law (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 
1985), and State Supreme Courts: Policymakers in the Federal System (Mary Cornelia Porter 
& G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982)). 
 256 See, e.g., Zink v. Lombardi, No. 2:12-cv-4209-NKL, 2012 WL 12828155, at *7 
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 16, 2012); Sims v. Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 308–9 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2018). Only Zink evaluated whether Missouri’s separation of powers doctrine was consistent 
with Arkansas’s to determine if Jones was persuasive. Id.  
 257 See Zink, 2012 WL 12828155, at *8 (concluding that Missouri’s legislature had 
established a general policy by identifying the method for executions); Cook v. State, 281 
P.3d 1053, 1055–56 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding that appointing the Department of 
Corrections to supervise executions and specifying the method was a sufficient standard to 
guide the Department); Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305–06 (identifying the legislative 
policy as using lethal gas or lethal injection to implement executions); Diaz v. State, 945 So. 
2d 1136, 1145 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam) (relying on Sims); Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 
(Fla. 2000) (per curiam) (explaining that the statute “clearly defines the punishment to be 
imposed” and “makes clear that the legislative purpose is to impose death”); State v. Ellis, 
799 N.W.2d 267, 289 (Neb. 2011) (relying on other jurisdictions’ analyses to conclude that 
the legislature declared a policy and set a “primary standard” by identifying the purpose of 
the statute, the punishment, and a general means); Brown v. Vail, 237 P.3d 263, 269 (Wash. 
2010) (en banc) (explaining that the legislature had sufficiently identified policy by 
identifying the method and place of execution and which officials set execution protocols 
and supervised executions). 
 258 Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307.  
 259 See Cook, 281 P.3d at 1056; Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305; see also Ex parte 
Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (presuming that the 
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Court of Appeals explained that the federal Constitution “implicitly guides and 
limits the Department’s discretion” because the Department’s protocols had to 
comply with a constitutional requirement that execution protocols avoid a 
substantial risk of serious harm, pain, and suffering.260 This conclusion is 
questionable. Legislative enactments may not violate constitutions and agencies 
are already required to comply with constitutional limitations on punishment in 
conducting executions.261 Therefore a reliance on constitutional restrictions 
does not meaningfully limit the discretion legislators confer on agencies.262 
In rejecting nondelegation arguments, courts also rely on the argument that 
agencies, not legislatures, are better equipped to develop execution protocols.263 
Courts may emphasize the technical nature of execution protocols and the need 
for continuous decision-making.264 Cook asserted that it was “impracticable” 
for the legislature to create a protocol, pointing to Arizona’s execution 
protocols, which “span[] 35 pages” and set procedures for a thirty-five day 
period leading up to the execution and the execution that required coordination 
with multiple government agencies, law enforcement, and the media.265 These 
analyses assume that corrections agencies have the requisite expertise to make 
these determinations.266 Deference to presumed agency expertise in a separation 
of powers analysis muddies the distinction between constitutionally permissible 
delegation and administrative competence.267 This deference is also often 
misplaced. As discussed infra, agencies often develop protocols without 
medical expertise or rely on other states’ protocols without engaging in their 
own fact-finding.268  
 
Director of the Department of Corrections will comply with constitutional requirements in 
selecting the drugs to be used in lethal injection). 
 260 Cook, 281 P.3d at 1056 (citing Dickens v. Brewer, 631 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 
2011)).  
 261 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 38–39 (2008). 
 262 See infra notes 393–426 and accompanying text.  
 263 See, e.g., Zink v. Lombardi, No. 2:12-cv-4209-NKL, 2012 WL 12828155, at *8 
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 16, 2012); Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307; Granviel, 561 S.W.2d at 515; 
Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam); Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 
670 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam); State v. Ellis, 799 N.W.2d 267, 289 (Neb. 2011).  
 264 Ellis, 799 N.W.2d at 289. 
 265 Cook, 281 P.3d at 1056 (“It contains detailed instructions on the various chemicals 
to be used, how they should be administered by Department personnel, and how the 
execution will be supervised and regulated.”).  
 266 Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 38; Daniel J. Solove, 
The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 
941, 969 (1999). 
 267 Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms 
in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2057–58 (2011) (asserting that 
agencies should not receive deference in constitutional inquiries when they operate outside 
“[a]dministrative law norms”). 
 268 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 75 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (concluding that 
protocols are a product of “‘administrative convenience’ . . . rather than a careful analysis of 
relevant considerations favoring or disfavoring a conclusion”); see also infra Part V.B.  
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Departments of corrections also receive a presumption that the discretion 
accompanying broad delegation will not lead to arbitrary decision-making.269 
Courts’ reliance on the existence of procedural safeguards to approve delegation 
is jarringly inconsistent with reality. Many jurisdictions exempt their execution 
protocols, or even their department of corrections, from state administrative 
procedure rules.270 This, as Berger points out, increases the risk that “the 
officials in charge of the procedure will throw something together haphazardly 
and without serious reflection on the constitutional issues.”271 Prisoners have 
argued that the absence of policy and lack of administrative procedure give 
agencies unconstitutionally broad discretion, to little avail.272 The Washington 
Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of adequate procedural 
safeguards for constitutional legislative delegation in criminal contexts: 
promulgating rules pursuant to Washington’s APA that include either an appeal 
process before the agency or judicial review, and the “procedural safeguards 
normally available to a criminal defendant remain.”273  
Despite the fact that Washington’s Department of Corrections was exempt 
from the state APA, the court concluded that procedural safeguards for 
promulgating execution protocols were met because prisoners could seek 
 
 269 See State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411, 420 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994), aff’d, 648 A.2d 423 
(Del. 1994) (presuming that the Department of Corrections will properly perform its duties); 
State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 201 (Idaho 1981) (“[W]e will not assume that the director of 
the department of corrections will act in other than a reasonable manner.”); Ex Parte 
Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 513, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (rejecting the 
presumption that the Director of the Department of Corrections will act in an “arbitrary” 
manner). 
 270 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604.1(a) (West 2020) (“The Administrative 
Procedure Act shall not apply to standards, procedures, or regulations promulgated pursuant 
to Section 3604.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 150B–1(d)(6) (West 2020); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 2.2-4002(B)(9) (West 2020) (exempting agency action relating to “[i]nmates of prisons or 
other such facilities or parolees therefrom”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.05.030(1)(c) 
(West 2020) (state APA does not apply to the department of corrections with respect to 
persons in the department’s custody or subject to their jurisdictions); In re Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons’ Execution Protocol Cases, 955 F.3d 106, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Rao, J., concurring); 
Hill v. Owens, 738 S.E.2d 56, 59–60 (Ga. 2013); Conner v. N.C. Council of State, 716 S.E.2d 
836, 845–46 (N.C. 2011) (holding that the Council of State’s approval of North Carolina’s 
lethal injection protocol is not subject to the APA); Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 
292, 311–12 (Tenn. 2005) (state corrections department does not have to adopt lethal 
injection protocol consistently with Tennessee APA); Porter v. Commonwealth, 661 S.E.2d 
415, 432–33 (Va. 2008). Other courts have held that administrative procedures apply when 
promulgating execution protocols, but these are the exception, rather than the norm. See 
Bowling v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 301 S.W.3d 478, 488 (Ky. 2009); Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 
25, 34 (Md. 2006).  
 271 Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 60.  
 272 See Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam); Granviel, 561 
S.W.2d at 515; Brown v. Vail, 237 P.3d 263, 269–70 (Wash. 2010) (en banc); see also 
Coglianese, supra note 120, at 1868 (explaining that compliance with administrative 
procedure may be a component of nondelegation inquiries per Schechter Poultry).  
 273 Brown, 237 P.3d at 270. 
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judicial review through lawsuits challenging execution methods and because the 
prisoners had received constitutional process during their trial and death 
sentence.274 Procedural safeguards attached to criminal convictions bear limited 
relevance to procedural processes in creating execution policies. Reliance on 
judicial review is problematic because it reinforces legislative abdication.  
Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins have demonstrated that the 
availability of engaged judicial review in capital punishment post-Gregg 
allowed state legislatures to pass responsibility to the judiciary, and once the 
trend had shifted, “traditional mechanisms of restraint had been literally 
abandoned.”275 Courts retain some of the burden that legislators have handed 
over. In Diaz v. State, the Florida Supreme Court brushed aside criticisms that 
the Department of Corrections was exempt from Florida’s APA. “In light of the 
exigencies inherent in the execution process,” the court explained, judicial 
review was “preferable” to administrative review.276 In other words, the 
judiciary would limit the Department’s authority, therefore the discretion the 
legislature had granted was within constitutional bounds.277  
But agencies’ wide discretion may interfere with judicial review. In addition 
to their unsuccessful nondelegation claim, Arizona prisoners argued in Cook 
that the unlimited authority of the Arizona Department of Corrections to set and 
revise execution protocols interfered with the judicial branch and violated the 
separation of powers doctrine.278 The Department repeatedly changed its 
execution protocols shortly before carrying out executions—in one case, 
eighteen hours before a scheduled execution.279 The Arizona Court of Appeals 
“agree[d]” that the Department’s recent habit of swapping protocols “at the last 
minute raise[d] constitutional concerns, as well as a separation of powers 
concern under the Arizona Constitution” by “threaten[ing] to prevent 
meaningful judicial review.”280 Shifting execution protocols left courts to 
address complex, fact-intensive constitutional questions in a short period of 
time, potentially obstructing judicial review and interfering with the duties of 
the judicial branch.281  
 
 274 Id.  
 275 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
AMERICAN AGENDA 100 (1986). 
 276 Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam). 
 277 See id. at 1143–44; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Essay, The Ascent of the 
Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1356–57 (2008).  
 278 Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1056 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).  
 279 Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2012); Towery v. Brewer, 672 
F.3d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 2012); Cook, 281 P.3d at 1056–57 (citing, inter alia, Order, State v. 
Beaty, No. CR-85-0211-AP/PC (Ariz. May 25, 2011)).  
 280 Cook, 281 P.3d at 1057 (footnote omitted). Last minute protocol changes “raised 
serious concerns under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment,” the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as that 
Amendment’s “guarantee of an inmate’s right to in-person visits with counsel . . . .” Id. at 
1057 n.5.  
 281 Id. at 1058.  
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The court ultimately concluded that, although the Department was on thin 
ice, it “ha[d] not yet violated the Arizona Constitution’s separation of powers 
doctrine” because courts could provide review (even if rushed).282 The court 
also assumed the Department’s new protocol, which required seven days’ 
written notice to the inmate identifying which lethal injection drugs the 
Department would use in an execution, would solve the problem.283 Although 
seven days was “relatively short,” it improved upon the one or two days’ notice 
the Department had provided in the past.284 The protocol provided that the 
director of the Department could deviate from the protocols at his or her 
discretion at any time, likely prompting the court’s warning that if the 
Department continued its practices in a way that interfered with judicial review, 
the court might reconsider its holding.285  
Courts also appear reluctant to address nondelegation challenges in part 
because of their novelty. In Sims v. State, the Florida Supreme Court rejected a 
nondelegation challenge to Florida’s lethal-injection statute in part because the 
previous version of the statute authorizing electrocution as the method of 
execution had not identified “the precise means, manner or amount of voltage 
to be applied.”286 Although there are instances in which electrocution statutes 
may permit delegation challenges,287 the court did not consider significant 
differences between the two methods of execution. The task of selecting drugs 
for executions, a quasi-medical procedure, carries significantly more discretion 
and involves different decision-making processes and factual inquiries than 
electrocution.  
It is certainly possible that the subject matter tilts courts’ decisions—courts 
that tend to uphold death sentences may be more reticent to apply their states’ 
nondelegation doctrines or more willing to tolerate broad delegation.288 Florida 
and Texas, for example, are death penalty strongholds.289 Of course, so is 
 
 282 Id.  
 283 Id. (explaining that new notice requirements, “if implemented by the Department, 
should help ensure meaningful judicial review . . . ”).  
 284 Id. at 1058.  
 285 Id.  
 286 Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam). 
 287 See Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 88 (discussing 
rulings that Nebraska’s electrocution execution protocols appeared to violate state law).  
 288 See Dan Levine & Kristina Cooke, In States with Elected High Court Judges, a 
Harder Line on Capital Punishment, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/ 
investigates/special-report/usa-deathpenalty-judges/ [https://perma.cc/3DEA-ABCS]. 
 289 See GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 3, at 138–39 (discussing geographic use 
of the death penalty); JON SORENSEN & ROCKY LEANN PILGRIM, LETHAL INJECTION: CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS DURING THE MODERN ERA 16 (2006) (stating that Texas sentenced 
925 people to death between 1973 and 2002); id. at 18–19 (discussing Texas’s capital 
punishment system).  
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Arkansas, rendering Jones a particularly intriguing deviation.290 Jones 
embraced a formalist perspective on separation of powers in holding that the 
legislature had to do more to curb agency discretion in creating execution 
protocols.291 Formalism, or strong nondelegation approaches, evince 
majoritarian values, favoring legislative power by insisting that elected officials 
make difficult policy determinations.292 Thus, requiring the Arkansas General 
Assembly to select the applicable classes of lethal injection drugs forced the 
legislature to engage more transparently with a fraught and controversial policy 
issue.293 
Functionalist, weak, or moderate approaches are also majoritarian because 
a “deferential approach leaves the bulk of the responsibility for structural design 
to the elected departments of government.”294 Some scholars contend that 
agencies are accountable and transparent due to their processes,295 but the 
secrecy and absence of administrative constraints on corrections agencies 
undercuts those arguments in the capital-sentencing context. Cook illustrates 
this problem quite precisely: agency flexibility created a substantial risk of 
interference with the judiciary’s ability to carry out its duties.296 
The separation of powers serves important functions in our system of 
government. Allowing agencies to take up the task of making important policy 
decisions without adequate legislative guidance, such as how the state will kill 
those it has deemed unworthy of living, destabilizes those values. The lack of 
legislative accountability and agency transparency undermines perceptions of 
legitimacy of the punishment. Relevant administrative law norms heighten the 
problem of broad delegation: agencies often lack expertise in crafting protocols, 
they rely on other jurisdictions, and are exempt from many procedural 
safeguards.  
V. NONDELEGATING DEATH 
As the previous parts of this Article have illustrated, delegating 
responsibility is a central part of the history of the American death penalty, 
current method of execution statutes, administrative protocols, and judicial 
 
 290 Between 1973 and 2002, Arkansas sentenced ninety-nine people to death. See 
SORENSON & PILGRIM, supra note 293, at 16; see also LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 69, 
at 100–01; SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 130–36.  
 291 See supra Part IV.A; see also Brown, supra note 115, at 1523–25. 
 292 Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 38; Brown, supra note 
115, at 1526.  
 293 See Murphy, supra note 10, at 837–39. 
 294 Brown, supra note 115, at 1528–29. 
 295 See, e.g., Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: 
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 
1957 (2008); Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century 
Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 1018 (2000); see also 
Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 43–44.  
 296 See Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).   
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decision-making. Legislatures may initiate the process of broad delegation, but 
the system of capital punishment is sustainable in part because of continued 
delegation across juries, judges, departments of corrections, officials, 
executioners, and the public.297  
This Part explores the flaws in legislative delegations as well as courts’ 
analyses of the problem of delegating death. It contends that the nondelegation 
doctrine offers important considerations such as accountability, transparency, 
and legitimacy in governance to evaluate capital punishment. It evaluates 
common problems in judicial review of nondelegation questions in capital 
punishment, particularly deference to agency expertise. This Part concludes by 
arguing that legislatures should not be allowed to delegate this significant policy 
choice and frames out a more robust nondelegation analysis for evaluating 
method of execution statutes.  
A. Why Nondelegation? 
This Article does not propose that legislatures should write exhaustive 
execution protocols addressing every possible contingency.298 Some delegation 
is inevitable and necessary in modern governance.299 Harold Bruff observes that 
courts struggle with applying the nondelegation doctrine “because no one has 
successfully articulated neutral principles for deciding how specific a particular 
delegation should have to be.”300 But, as Justice Gorsuch pointed out in Gundy, 
the Supreme Court has not entirely “abandoned the business of policing 
improper legislative delegations[,]” but instead applied other doctrines to “rein 
 
 297 See BESSLER, KISS OF DEATH, supra note 77, at 119 (“Only because responsibility 
for executions is spread so diffusely among the various actors in the criminal justice system 
do judges and jurors feel permission to disavow responsibility for the sentences they 
impose.”); LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 69, at 81–83; Dubber, supra note 14, at 547 
(discussing the “distribution of responsibility” that is “crucial to the American system of 
capital punishment”).  
 298 See BRUFF, supra note 121, at 140 (“The courts are properly reluctant to employ the 
doctrine vigorously, because it involves a constitutional decision that overrides a 
congressional judgment regarding the amount of discretion that should be accorded to the 
executive in a particular context.”).  
 299 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 
also BRUFF, supra note 121, at 140 (discussing the difficulties inherent in a “revived” and 
robust delegation doctrine); Madison, supra note 113, at 246 (discussing that the “legislative, 
executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each 
other”); Araiza, supra note 117, at 236–37; Cass, supra note 120, at 155–58 (discussing 
delegations of authority in early America). 
 300 See BRUFF, supra note 121, at 140; see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[W]hile the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a 
fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by 
the courts.”); Cass, supra note 120, at 181 (“The harder question is the line-drawing question: 
how do courts distinguish impermissible delegations of legislative power from permitted 
assignments of legal authority?”); Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 121, at 326–
27.  
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in Congress’s efforts to delegate legislative power . . . .”301 Courts can, and do, 
keep the balance between legislative and executive power.302 Unconstrained 
discretion upsets the balance, especially in criminal and capital punishment. 
Legislative accountability was a significant concern in Furman and the 
reshaping of the American death penalty.303 The breadth of agencies’ discretion 
to create execution protocols without real legislative guidance is another aspect 
of the overarching problem of accountability and decision-making in capital 
punishment.  
Rachel Barkow has argued for “criminal law exceptionalism” in separation 
of powers jurisprudence.304 Her work demonstrates the historical and 
constitutional underpinnings that support an argument for strict separation of 
powers in criminal law, including the division of functions in the criminal law 
among each branch.305 The Framers favored limiting power to prevent abuse of 
criminal process through the separation of powers.306 Death penalty 
exceptionalism exists in criminal and constitutional law because “death is a 
punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree.”307 The 
state’s authority to impose criminal penalties arises from the power the people 
invested in it. The state’s authority to kill flows from the same source. 
Narrowing a jury’s discretion is necessary to ensure that sentences are 
proportional to the offense.308 Constraining agency discretion ensures that the 
proper parties are making the right decisions with the right process.309 Without 
 
 301 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see 
also supra note 120 and accompanying text.  
 302 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2135–38 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 303 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255–57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. 
at 309–10 (Potter, J., concurring); id. at 313–14 (White, J., concurring); see also Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (“Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a 
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should 
be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize 
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 303 (1976) (“North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty statute provides no standards 
to guide the jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine which first-degree 
murderers shall live and which shall die. And there is no way under the North Carolina law 
for the judiciary to check arbitrary and capricious exercise of that power through a review of 
death sentences.”); BANNER, supra note 36, at 261–64 (discussing Furman v. Georgia).  
These schemes do not resolve the problem of extreme discretion—they merely shift it 
elsewhere. See BANNER, supra note 36, at 273 (discussing the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s 
briefs in Gregg v. Georgia); GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 3, at 137–40 (discussing 
geographic disparity in the death penalty due in part to prosecutorial discretion). 
 304 Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at 1012.  
 305 Id. at 1012–17.  
 306 Id. at 1017; see Hessick & Hessick, supra note 172, at 25–26.  
 307 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303–04; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 286–89 (Brennan, J., 
concurring).  
 308 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).  
 309 See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 121, at 339 (explaining that the 
“link” between “individual rights and interests” and “institutional design” is preserved 
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proper constraints at the different points of the capital-punishment process, there 
is a risk of arbitrarily imposed death sentences,310 or arbitrarily selected methods 
of execution. 
Unconstrained agency discretion in the context of figuring out a method of 
execution implicates three primary problems associated with separation of 
powers: accountability, transparency, and the perception of legitimacy.311 
Accountability addresses who is responsible for making decisions and who 
receives the credit (or blame).312 Transparency relates to preserving democratic 
values and inmates’ access to judicial review. A lack of transparency and 
unlimited agency discretion in decisions about punishment and killing 
undermines the legitimacy of government action.313  
Accountability is a central value in the legitimacy of criminal punishment, 
sentencing practices, and the state’s power to kill.314 As David Schoenbrod 
points out, delegating allows legislators to claim the credit for purported benefits 
for a statute and evade blame for burdens or negative consequences.315 By 
authorizing the death penalty, legislators can claim to be tough on crime and 
then blame the agency for flaws in administering penalty,316 or leave the mess 
 
through “a requirement that certain controversial or unusual actions will occur only with 
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 310 But see GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 3, at 138–54; Jordan M. Steiker, The 
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GENERATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RESEARCH 23, 23–46 (Charles S. Lanier et al. eds., 
2009).  
 311 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that changing regulations across administrations implicates fair notice and 
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Attorney General address a complicated problem); SCHOENBROD, supra note 118, at 14–19; 
Whittington & Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 122, at 412.  
 312 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 172, at 29–30; Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 
supra note 121, at 319–20.  
 313 See Barkow, Ascent of the Administrative State, supra note 277, at 1336.  
 314 See Andrea Roth, “Spit and Acquit”: Prosecutors as Surveillance Entrepreneurs, 
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emphasizes that accountability also reflects democratic values and community norms. “A 
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 315 SCHOENBROD, supra note 118, at 10.  
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make hard choices.”); see also Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at 1030–31 
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to courts to sort out.317 Individuals convicted of capital offenses are a 
“politically unpopular minority,”318 and legislators have little to lose and much 
to gain by supporting the death penalty, even if its use is infrequent, arbitrary, 
and riddled with error. Legislatures receive political capital for authorizing the 
death penalty and accordingly should be accountable for that decision and the 
inevitable consequences.319 To the extent that legislators reevaluate the death 
penalty and alter a method of execution statute, they do so more frequently, as 
Deborah Denno argues, “to stay one step ahead of a looming constitutional 
challenge to that method because the acceptability of the death penalty process 
itself therefore becomes jeopardized.”320 Legislative enactments on capital 
punishment focus on continuing executions by preserving secrecy, accessing 
tools or drugs for executions, and avoiding litigation, rather than humanitarian 
and constitutional concerns.321 
Broad delegation interferes with transparency and access to justice.322 Hugo 
Bedau observes that, due to the secrecy surrounding executions, “the average 
American literally does not know what is being done when the government, in 
his name and presumably on his behalf, executes a criminal.”323 Secrecy and 
unconstrained discretion contribute to delays in litigation and repeat litigation. 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Bucklew v. Precythe,324 refuted the majority 
opinion’s complaints about litigation delays by pointedly observing that secrecy 
 
 317 See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 275, at 100 (discussing state legislatures’ 
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Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 61; Corinna Lain, Deciding Death, 57 
DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2007).  
 319 See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 275, at 100; Cass, supra note 120, at 154 
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 320 Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 65.  
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shift to lethal injection); id. at 118–20 (discussing the optics of lethal injection); Deborah W. 
Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 27, at 116 (2007); Denno, When 
Legislatures Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 125; see also Interim Report No. 14 at 4, In 
the Matter of the Multicounty Grand Jury, State of Okla., Nos. SCAD-2014-70, GJ-2014-1 
(May 19, 2016), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/MCGJ-Interim-Report-5-
19-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G2Q-HKN7] [hereinafter Interim Multicounty Grand Jury 
Report] (explaining that the Department of Corrections revised its execution protocols after 
“complications” arising from Clayton Lockett’s execution).  
 322 See Berger, Individual Rights, supra note 267, at 2065–66 (explaining the importance 
of transparency in judicial review of administrative decision-making); Hessick & Hessick, 
supra note 172, at 34–36 (discussing how delegation exacerbates the “fiction” of “notice to 
the public of their legal obligations”).  
 323 THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 14 (Hugo Adam Bedau, 3d ed. 1982).  
 324 See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1145–48 (2019) (Sotomayor J., 
dissenting).  
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surrounding execution protocols and changes to protocols (due in no small part 
to agency discretion) leave inmates often unable to challenge protocols or 
decisions about executions until close in time to executions.325 Cook illustrates 
this point: the Arizona Department of Corrections’ discretion to make last-
minute revisions to execution protocols threatened “to ‘usurp the powers,’ of 
the Judiciary” by undermining its ability to engage in judicial review.326 Part of 
the challenges of rapid judicial review may stem from courts’ unwillingness to 
stay executions, but altering protocols immediately before execution or during 
litigation unquestionably impacts judicial review, particularly when agencies 
are not constrained by procedural or fact-finding requirements.  
Excessive delegation and limited accountability and transparency 
undermine the perception of the legitimacy of the death penalty. Delegation “is 
closely connected both with the rule of law concept and the theory of 
representative government.”327 Requiring legislation to have defining standards 
“serves the function of ensuring that fundamental policy decisions will be made, 
not by some appointed bureaucrats, but by the elected representatives of the 
people.”328 Ronald Cass emphasizes that the question of legitimacy “goes 
beyond Locke’s declaration that the people have not consented to a grant of 
legislative power to others.”329 Instead, Cass contends that legitimacy is linked 
to concerns about accountability: legislators benefit from granting power to 
others, and that self-interest undermines legitimacy.330 Legislative enactments, 
as opposed to agency determinations, may better reflect democratic, as opposed 
to purely majoritarian, decision-making.331 
To be sure, courts have emphasized that the Executive is directly 
accountable to the people, and so that branch can reasonably make policy 
determinations to “resolve the competing interests which Congress itself either 
inadvertently did not resolve or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency 
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”332 
But majoritarian reasoning ignores the plight of politically unpopular groups.333 
Delegating to administrative agencies the task of crafting execution protocols 
 
 325 See id. at 1147–48 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also generally KONRAD, supra 
note 24.  
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 328 Schwartz, supra note 120, at 445.  
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§ 141, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 363 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1988) (1690)); see Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., 
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 330 See Cass, supra note 120, at 153–55.  
 331 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 118, at 110; Berger, In Search of a Theory of 
Deference, supra note 14, at 43; Schwartz, supra note 120, at 445.  
 332 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).  
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without legislative oversight or supervision undermines the legitimacy of the 
punishment because secrecy and unconstrained discretion blur the lines between 
legislative and executive power and eliminate checks on the exercise of 
power.334 These harms stretch beyond the potential for cruelty and suffering in 
administration of the death penalty—they also threaten the democratic process.  
Although judicial enforcement via the nondelegation doctrine may magnify 
the role of the judiciary, that branch has taken on an outsized role in part because 
of legislative delegation and secrecy. The next part evaluates key aspects of 
judicial inquiry into agency discretion to demonstrate why a more robust 
nondelegation inquiry into legislative delegation in method of execution statutes 
is necessary.  
B. Agency Expertise and Limits on Discretion 
Judicial review in nondelegation cases reveals unwarranted reliance on 
agency expertise and willingness to gloss over existing separation of powers 
principles. Courts tend to place too much reliance on the legislative decision to 
adopt the death penalty, as well as a general choice of a method of execution.335 
In Sims v. Kernan, the California Court of Appeals relied substantially on 
legislative enactments unrelated to carrying out the death penalty to conclude 
there was a sufficient policy.336 The court described agency protocols as 
“subsidiary decisions” to the choice to impose the death penalty and the method, 
rejecting litigants’ arguments that legislative policy should at a minimum 
include decisions about “pain, speed, reliability, and transparency.”337 
California’s separation of powers jurisprudence dictated that the legislative 
body’s representative nature required it to settle contested policy matters and 
crucial issues when it had the “time, information, and competence” to do so.338 
The court did not disagree that the legislature could make those evaluations, but 
concluded that lethal injection drug shortages justified institutional flexibility, 
and the Department of Corrections would be in the “best position” to adjust 
protocols in response to “lessons learned” from botched executions 
nationally.339  
This sort of reasoning misses the mark. The legislative decision to authorize 
capital punishment is a separate policy judgment from how a sentence shall be 
carried out, and both are legislative decisions. The death penalty, capital trial 
procedure, or the location of death row do not set out factual inquiries for 
agencies developing execution protocols to resolve or criteria to evaluate against 
 
 334 See Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at 1023–24.  
 335 See Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 70–71. 
 336 Sims v. Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 303, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); see supra 
notes 257–58 and accompanying text.   
 337 Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306.  
 338 Clean Air Constituency v. Cal. State Air Res. Bd., 523 P.2d 617, 627 (Cal. 1974). 
 339 Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307.  
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facts the agency must consider.340 Capital trial procedures do not resolve 
procedural concerns about how execution protocols are developed.341 
Generalized legislative statements about the goals of capital punishment do not 
provide clear standards.342 These are inadequate substitutes for legislative 
specificity, factual inquiry, and administrative procedures and guidance.343 
Merely selecting a generic method of execution like lethal injection or lethal 
gas may not offer sufficient guidance to an agency that develops protocols. 
“Substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death”344 or 
“lethal gas” encompass a range of gases and drugs that have varying effects on 
the human body ranging from swift, slow, possibly painless, or excruciating 
deaths.345 These methods carry substantial room for discretion and significant 
potential for arbitrary action if agencies lack policy guidance or criteria from 
the legislature. Generally worded statutes make it difficult to evaluate whether 
the agency has complied with the legislature’s directive because it may not be 
clear what the directive is other than ensuring that the condemned inmate dies.  
A weaker approach to nondelegation preserves agency flexibility to respond 
to developing situations. The Oklahoma legislators who drafted the first lethal 
injection statute kept “the statutory language vague in order to accommodate the 
development of new and better drug technologies in the future.”346 The 
legislators did not include any oversight or specifications and the result was to 
“delegate ‘to Oklahoma prison officials all critical decisions regarding the 
implementation of lethal injection.’”347 But building this discretion into the 
system incentivizes agencies to imitate without engaging in fact-finding or 
assessments of whether another state’s protocols are actually effective. When 
Oklahoma sought more recently to revise its protocols following Clayton 
Lockett’s botched execution in 2014, the director of the Department of 
Corrections “asked administration members to obtain public[ly] available 
execution policies from other states, including Arizona, Florida, and Texas, 
identify these states’ policies, and merge their best and most efficient practices 
into the Department’s new Execution Protocol.”348  
Agency competence is a distinct but interrelated issue from nondelegation 
because courts substantially rely on agencies’ presumed expertise and position 
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in upholding broad legislative delegations.349 This inquiry misses a key step in 
the analysis—whether the agency actually has the expertise. Denno has 
demonstrated that the officials who develop execution protocols frequently lack 
technical or medical expertise.350 This may be due to concerns over the ethics 
of medical involvement in executions.351 Execution methods are not subjected 
to medical or scientific study before their implementation and may be held to 
lower standards than those used in animal euthanasia.352 The prevalence of 
botched executions lends substantial support to the argument that there are 
deficiencies in agencies’ procedures. Austin Sarat estimates that 7.12% of 
lethal-injection executions have been botched, lending substantial support to 
critiques of execution procedures.353 This may be, as Denno has explained, 
“partly attributable to the dearth of written procedures provided to the 
executioners concerning how to perform an execution.”354 Other factors in 
botched executions may include inadequate training in administering drugs or 
inserting IVs, particularly for individuals who are in poor health, are obese, or 
have a history of drug abuse,355 as well as flaws in the drugs used.356  
Agencies’ attempts to shift responsibility through the “discrete task” 
approach discussed supra, may also lend itself to errors.357 Oklahoma’s 
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revisions to its execution protocols did not prevent errors in Charles Warner’s 
execution or Richard Glossip’s scheduled execution.358 The Interim Grand Jury 
Report presents a disturbing picture of inattention to detail. The Warner 
execution team overlooked that they were using the wrong drug—potassium 
acetate, instead of potassium chloride.359 None could explain how it happened 
other than that they assumed someone else had approved it, or that they 
“dropped the ball.”360  
Baze’s prospective approval of lethal injection protocols only encourages 
this majoritarian approach in death, delegation, and deference.361 Baze warned 
against interfering with state legislatures’ roles in determining execution 
procedures, particularly because states act “with an earnest desire to provide for 
a progressively more humane manner of death.”362 The difficulty with this 
assertion is that agencies do far more than legislatures—without oversight. 
Baze’s approach conflates agencies and legislatures, giving one the deference 
due to the other.363 Berger asserts that the “lack of legislative input casts serious 
doubts on the [Baze] plurality’s insistence that rigorous judicial inquiry ‘would 
substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing their 
execution procedures.’”364 States may serve as laboratories of experimentation, 
but the freedom to experiment cannot justify weakening important structural 
protections built into state and federal constitutions.  
Changes to execution protocols only highlight agencies’ inexpertise and the 
breadth of agency discretion. Oklahoma’s brief experimentation with nitrogen 
hypoxia as a method of execution that began in 2015 illustrates this problem.365 
Oklahoma’s legislators relied on a fourteen-page report created over “three 
hours one evening”366 by three professors who are not medical doctors.367 
Oklahoma’s legislators also watched YouTube videos of teenagers inhaling 
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helium.368 The bill only authorized nitrogen hypoxia as a method of execution 
in the event that lethal injection drugs were not available.369 There were no 
details or guidance for the agency.370 The legislature did not designate who 
would determine that lethal injection is “otherwise unavailable,” or criteria for 
making the determination.371 In 2018, Oklahoma’s Attorney General 
determined that, due to a severe shortage of execution drugs, Oklahoma would 
switch to nitrogen hypoxia as its method of execution.372 After delays in 
creating the protocol and obtaining necessary equipment,373 the Attorney 
General announced in early 2020 that the state had “found a reliable supply of 
drugs to resume executions by lethal injection[]” and the Department of 
Corrections would “continue[] to work on a protocol that will allow the state to 
proceed by execution through nitrogen hypoxia where appropriate.”374  
Executive agencies and officials may not comply even when legislatures 
provide more specific instructions.375 Montana’s execution protocol has been 
struck down twice for violating the Montana Constitution’s separation of powers 
provision because the protocol was inconsistent with the state’s method of 
execution statute.376 Montana’s decision to identify the classes of execution 
drugs made it possible for a court to evaluate the extent to which the agency 
complied with the will of the legislature, even if the agency had discretion in 
dosage calculation or other procedures that might need to be modified based on 
the specific facts and conditions of particular executions.377 While this is a 
separate administrative law inquiry, it is relevant to a court’s decision to defer 
to agency expertise.  
Inadequate criteria or fact-finding obligations incentivize agencies to take 
shortcuts. Agencies’ tendency to copycat other jurisdictions’ protocols and 
statutes concerning the death penalty, coupled with Baze’s prospective 
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approvals, allows courts to rely on the similarity to other jurisdictions’ 
protocols, rather than the individual agency’s research, fact-finding, or 
procedure. It also undermines claims that agencies have real expertise and 
demonstrates that the protocols lack what Berger describes as a “democratic 
pedigree”—the “political authority and epistemic authority underlying the 
policy.”378 Such protocols deserve far less deference than courts accord them.379 
Reliance on procedural controls is also misplaced. Agencies’ ability to alter 
execution protocols depends on the extent to which agencies are bound by state 
procedural rules. Agencies do not usually have to comply with state APA rules 
to create execution protocols.380 Barkow has observed that, absent oversight or 
internal controls on matters of charging and plea bargaining, “the potential for 
arbitrary enforcement is high.”381 Scholars have contended that delegation in 
criminal law contexts should be treated differently because such delegations are 
“inconsistent with foundational criminal law doctrine, . . . present greater 
threats to the principles underlying the nondelegation doctrine, and . . . are not 
supported by the ordinary arguments in favor of delegation.”382 The same 
arguments apply in execution protocols. Absent any restraints, there is a risk of 
arbitrariness in selecting drugs or substances to cause death, and the 
consequences can be horrifying.383 Unlimited agency discretion in the death 
penalty context allows agencies to wield both legislative power and executive 
power. Internal measures are necessary to protect individual rights when an 
agency can use the powers of multiple branches.384 Courts addressing 
nondelegation challenges are too willing to ignore the absence of internal 
procedural checks as a constraint on agency discretion even when state 
nondelegation doctrines expressly rely on such checks.385  
Vague legislation and a lack of administrative procedure leave courts doing 
precisely what the Baze plurality forecasted: “transform[ing] courts into boards 
of inquiry charged with determining ‘best practices’ for executions, with each 
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ruling supplanted by another round of litigation touting a new and improved 
methodology.”386 Despite criticisms that judicial enforcement of delegation 
could overexpand the role of the judiciary,387 the judiciary has already taken on 
an outsized role. A stricter approach arguably better serves separation of powers 
principles by forcing the legislative branch to become more accountable. To be 
sure, legislators are not rendered experts by virtue of elected office. Oklahoma’s 
nitrogen hypoxia experiment aptly illustrates this point.388 But legislators 
should impose more substantial guidelines, criteria, and procedural controls on 
agencies than “sufficient to cause death.” And courts can—and should—comply 
with their constitutional obligation to enforce separation of powers norms. 
C. Why Death is Nondelegable 
As long as states and the federal government intend to continue using the 
death penalty, they must grapple with decision-making in executions. Who 
makes decisions, and how they are made, are fundamental concepts underlying 
our constitutional system.389 Rebecca Brown argues that separation of powers 
principles under the nondelegation doctrine implicate individual liberties, 
because “procedural requirements and separated powers are simply different 
limitations on the exercise of government power, sharing a common goal: to 
restrict arbitrary government action that is likely to harm the rights of 
individuals.”390 Unconstrained agency delegation to create execution protocols 
threatens prisoners’ rights by increasing the risk that capital punishment will be 
inexpertly administered and cause severe pain and suffering. Weakening the 
separation of powers poses a threat to core democratic systems.  
Nondelegation may seem especially counterintuitive because discretion and 
delegation are essential to continuing state-authorized killing.391 Indeed, courts 
seem to favor delegation as a matter of legislative convenience, potentially for 
countermajoritarian concerns.392 Berger has highlighted this issue as a false 
application of countermajoritarian concerns about unelected judges making 
 
 386 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008); In re Ohio Execution Protocol, 860 F.3d 881, 
886 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 387 See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 121, at 321.  
 388 See supra notes 367–75 and accompanying text.  
 389 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).  
 390 Brown, supra note 115, at 1555–56.  
 391 Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1056 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (“It is both reasonable 
and . . . acceptable for the Legislature to delegate the details . . . to an agency that is ‘better 
equipped to undertake the task’ of ensuring that it is implemented as uniformly and humanely 
as possible.”) (quoting Griffith Energy, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 108 P.3d 282, 287 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2005)); Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en 
banc) (“[T]he Legislature has . . . delegated to the said Director power to determine details 
so as to carry out the legislative purpose which the Legislature cannot practically or 
efficiently perform itself.”). 
 392 See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155–56 (2002).  
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decisions about “policy decisions made by government officials who answer to 
the people.”393 When decisions are made by unelected and unsupervised 
agencies, “judicial deference to them rests on shakier grounds.”394 Similarly, 
the countermajoritarian difficulty is not as pronounced when judicial decision-
making is aimed at preserving individual rights for disadvantaged groups.395 
Death penalty exceptionalism fits within theories of nondelegation that 
support heightened inquiry in criminal law contexts. The degree of discretion 
that is acceptable should vary with the scope of the power that the legislature 
accords an agency, as well as the executive agency or officer tasked with 
carrying out the directives.396 The power to kill is an extraordinary one with 
potential for incurable harm.397 Cass Sunstein has observed that “nondelegation 
canons” constrain Congress from delegating certain tasks to agencies, 
particularly when individual rights are implicated.398 A more robust 
nondelegation inquiry is appropriate in evaluating method of execution statutes 
because of the impact on individual rights and the potential for mischief in 
undermining separation of powers in the state’s decision to kill.  
In applying this analysis, courts should recognize that a method of execution 
is a separate policy determination from the decision to use capital punishment 
and should not import legislative enactments regarding the latter to conclude 
that agencies have sufficient guidance to carry out the former. Blurring those 
lines fails to hold legislators to their constitutional responsibility to define 
crimes and fix punishments.399 Courts should also examine whether statutes 
assign responsibility for fact-finding in nondelegation inquiries.400 Few method 
of execution statutes contain requirements for agency fact-finding about speed, 
pain, and drug effectiveness for lethal injection or other methods of 
 
 393 Berger, Individual Rights, supra note 267, at 2059–60.  
 394 Id. at 2060; see also Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 42 
(“When courts strike down an agency policy adopted in secret with no legislative guidance 
or oversight, the countermajoritarian concern sharply decreases.”).  
 395 See Aliza Cover, Cruel and Invisible Punishment: Redeeming the Counter-
Majoritarian Eighth Amendment, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1147–48 (2014).  
 396 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn’s, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001); see also Loving v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772–73 (1996); Coglianese, supra note 120, at 1872–73.  
 397 Interim Multicounty Grand Jury Report, supra note 321, at 74 (depriving Charles 
Frederick Warner of his right to contest the method of execution in accordance with 
Oklahoma regulations); LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION, supra note 4 (manuscript at 43–44); 
Konrad, Lethal Injection, supra note 360, at 1133–37; see also SARAT, GRUESOME 
SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 177–210 (identifying botched executions).  
 398 See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 121, at 331–32.  
 399 See Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916); see also Weems v. United States, 
217 U.S. 349, 378–79 (1910); Malloroy v. State, 435 P.2d 254, 255 (Idaho 1967). 
 400 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the notion that fact-finding functions are sufficient to satisfy the “intelligible 
principle” requirement, and emphasizing that Congress still must make the policy underlying 
such fact-finding).  
976 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:5 
execution.401 Requiring express directives from legislatures on this issue402 fits 
within the contours of Justice Gorsuch’s heightened intelligible principle 
inquiry in Gundy.403 It also requires legislators to “make the policy judgments” 
about Eighth Amendment punishment by setting out terms of those inquiries.404 
Aspects of execution protocols may require some agency flexibility, 
including sourcing drugs and chemicals for executions, the need to identify 
alternative substances, dosage calculation, or other on-the-spot decisions. But 
the absence of facts for executives to consider and “criteria against which to 
measure them”405 has proved problematic. A lack of legislative guidance 
arguably contributed to agencies’ behavior in illegally importing drugs for 
executions.406 Despite federal and state laws addressing who may obtain and 
store controlled substances, agencies still obtain drugs without compliance, 
explaining sourcing, or how they spend state dollars.407 States may prefer a non-
specific method of execution statute to permit flexibility in the face of drug 
 
 401 See Brief for the Fordham University School of Law, Louis Stein Center for Law and 
Ethics as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 22–24, Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) 
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been adopted, as derived from Oklahoma’s “purposefully vague” 1977 law); see also supra 
notes 176–96 and accompanying text (discussing states’ method of execution statutes).  
 402 Denno has proposed that states conduct “in-depth study of the proper implementation 
of lethal injection.” This study would assist in fact-finding issues for states in developing 
procedures that presumably reduce pain or error, as well as identifying and responding to 
botched executions. Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 321, at 118–21.  
 403 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141.  
 404 Id.  
 405 Id.  
 406 See KONRAD, BEHIND THE CURTAIN, supra note 24, at 24, 32; LAIN, LETHAL 
INJECTION, supra note 4, at 14–22; Federal Authorities Seize Execution Drugs Imported for 
Arizona and Texas, CBS NEWS (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/federal-
authorities-seize-execution-drugs-imported-for-arizona-and-texas/ [https://perma.cc/47R9-
PYWA]; Madlin Mekelburg, FDA Blocks Texas Import of Execution Drug, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 
19, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/04/19/fda-blocks-texas-import-execution-
drug/ [https://perma.cc/ECL3-F5LB]. See also generally Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013). The DOJ recently issued an opinion concluding that the FDA lacks jurisdiction 
in this arena. See Whether the Food and Drug Administration Has Jurisdiction over Articles 
Intended for Use in Lawful Executions, 43 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 (2019), https://www.justice.gov 
/olc/opinion/file/1162686/download [https://perma.cc/DQN3-CE64]. 
 407 See Interim Multicounty Grand Jury Report, supra note 321, at 18, 21 (“[T]he 
Department never obtained [Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs] or DEA 
registration allowing it to possess and/or store execution-related drugs . . . . OBNDD’s 
Deputy General Counsel testified he has no idea how the Department properly obtained the 
execution drugs . . . .”); LAIN, LETHAL Injection, supra note 4, at 41–45; Nebraska Supreme 
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Experiment with Execution Methods, supra note 68, at 717.  
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shortages. The need for flexibility alone, however, cannot justify unlimited 
discretion without fact-finding obligations or a set of criteria and obligations for 
agencies to consider before changing drugs or procedures. Legislatures are quite 
capable of writing statutes that give agencies the ability to choose between 
alternatives contingent on fact-finding or provide standards for agencies to use 
when making decisions. 
Take Tennessee. While its default method of execution is lethal injection, it 
permits electrocution if “[t]he commissioner of correction certifies to the 
governor that one (1) or more of the ingredients essential to carrying out a 
sentence of death by lethal injection is unavailable through no fault of the 
department.”408 This provision might not be a model of legislative clarity, but it 
does set a condition (certification) and imply a requirement of fact-finding 
(unavailability) before permitting the commissioner to switch methods. A court 
reviewing such a decision would have some facts and criteria to evaluate.409 
Arkansas also has offered some helpful specificity. The amended AMEA 
requires ADC to use FDA-approved drugs obtained from either an FDA-
approved facility or nationally accredited compounding pharmacy.410 Again, 
this sets measurable criteria for courts, even if there are problems with drug 
sourcing and pharmacies.411 
Methods of execution statutes that require lethal injection be “swift and 
humane”412 arguably offer a more identifiable policy to agencies tasked with 
creating protocols. This standard, however, is not sufficient by itself because it 
fails to address important concerns about agency expertise, personnel training, 
and qualifications. Nor does it prevent agencies from shifting protocols without 
fact-finding or measurable criteria. Giving agencies broad discretion to change 
execution methods without factual findings or justification for those changes 
creates a high risk of arbitrary action that may be difficult for courts to review, 
especially when inmates’ challenges to execution protocols require swift 
judicial decision-making.413 
An absence of procedure presents a threat to judicial review and should 
carry greater weight in nondelegation cases because it interferes with the 
balance of powers.414 State nondelegation doctrines’ reliance on procedural 
 
 408 TENN. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 40-23-114(e)(2) (West 2020).  
 409 Cf. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 410 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(d) (West 2020).  
 411 See LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION, supra note 4, at 29–41 (discussing compounding 
pharmacies). 
 412 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(a) (West 2020). Kansas also requires certification that 
the substances must comply with these criteria and any proposed changes require the same 
certification. Id. § 22-4001(c).  
 413 See Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1056–57 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).   
 414 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Such an ‘evasive standard’ 
could threaten the separation of powers if it . . . allowed the agency to make the ‘important 
policy choices’ that belong to Congress while frustrating ‘meaningful judicial review.’” 
(quoting Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 676, 685–6 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring))); Cook, 281 P.3d at 1058 (“If the Department were to 
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protections in decision-making is sensible, because compliance with state 
procedural requirements preserves accountability by requiring agencies to 
engage with legislatively established processes in reaching decisions.415 When 
agencies are free to alter their own protocols for any reason at all, including 
notice obligations to inmates about execution methods, it threatens to interfere 
with the judicial branch’s responsibilities.416 Courts’ reluctance to hold agencies 
accountable for interference with judicial review abdicates the court’s essential 
role in preserving the separation of powers as much as a legislative decision that 
hands over core lawmaking power.417  
The lack of transparency from agencies receiving these delegations should 
also weigh against deferring to agency judgments.418 Although the legislature 
has enacted these statutory provisions, indicating a policy preference for 
secrecy, such secrecy is concerning, especially when there are few (or no) 
procedural controls on agencies.419 Secrecy should be a component of 
nondelegation inquiries because in the capital punishment context, secrecy 
corrodes accountability and creates a risk that agencies will improperly wield 
broad powers, especially because they lack constraints on their discretion.  
Courts also err by treating constitutional prohibitions on cruel and unusual 
punishment as limitations on agency discretion that preserve broad 
delegations.420 First, these prohibitions address different interests. Rachel 
 
continue [revising execution protocol] in such a way as to unreasonably limit . . . the courts 
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Barkow points out that the Bill of Rights “police[s] government abuse of power 
to an extent, [but does] . . . not guard against the same structural abuses as the 
separation of powers.”421 To be sure, there is a relationship between an Eighth 
Amendment claim and a nondelegation claim in the death penalty because 
arbitrary agency action, insufficient guidance, or expertise can trigger errors in 
executions that may cause severe pain and suffering.422 Separation of powers 
implicates process concerns and prevents the aggrandizement of power.423 The 
Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments 
and accordingly does not check the potential for mischief inherent in allowing 
an agency to wield executive and legislative powers.424 
Second, constitutional principles cannot curb agency discretion. Cary 
Coglianese has evaluated the importance of limits on discretion through the 
intelligible principle analysis: “A statute will be constitutional as long as an 
executive officer’s discretion is not unbounded in the same way that Congress’s 
is.”425 As the Supreme Court pointed out in Whitman v. American Trucking 
Associations, Inc., agencies cannot restrict overly broad delegations of 
legislative power by picking their own limiting constructions of statutory 
authority.426 Courts should not rely on agencies to limit themselves, particularly 
because agencies cannot construe statutes unconstitutionally so they must 
already comply with constitutional restrictions on pain and suffering in 
executions.427 The intelligible principle requirement and parallel state law 
doctrines dictate that the legislature must set the policy in the legislation it 
enacts.428 
In light of the stakes inherent in carrying out death sentences and the 
horrifying consequences of broad agency discretion and responsibility-shifting 
mechanisms in capital punishment, legislators should have a greater obligation 
to define the punishment for a capital sentence. Courts should play their part by 
protecting separation of powers and administrative law norms to inject greater 
accountability in a system that, thus far, demands very little.  
 
 421 Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at 1032.   
 422 See, e.g., State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411, 420 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994), aff’d, 648 A.2d 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
An argument that principles of nondelegation are viable in evaluating the 
death penalty may sound like grasping at straws to oppose the death penalty. 
Why bother asking legislatures to be more specific in considering how prisoners 
should be executed? Do arguments about how these decisions are made, who 
makes the decisions, policy, and procedure really just paper over other glaring 
defects in the death penalty?429 Some may contend that these challenges are 
attempts to evade a lawfully-imposed sentence by complaining about technical 
and procedural trivialities. 
The separation of powers and compliance with procedure are integral 
constitutional principles that matter a great deal in a democratic society and are 
core values in the American system of government.430 As Justice Frankfurter 
explained, “The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of 
procedural safeguards.”431 The history of the imposition of the death penalty 
appears to be one of largely unconstrained delegation by virtually every entity 
or individual involved in capital punishment. 
In making decisions about death, it is tempting to try to find someone else 
to carry the burden or to be accountable. In Caldwell v. Mississippi,432 the 
Supreme Court held that “it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death 
sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe 
that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s 
death rests elsewhere.”433 Nor should it be constitutionally permissible to allow 
legislatures to shirk their constitutional obligation to set punishments, especially 
in capital sentencing. The choice to enact the death penalty is a separate policy 
choice than how the state chooses to kill. Legislatures should not be able to shift 
the responsibility for determining how the state kills in the name of the people 
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to agencies, particularly because they systematically remove procedural 
constraints associated with accountability and transparency. Passing difficult 
policy decisions to agencies that lack oversight or transparency undermines core 
democratic values. 
Responsibility for death cannot, and should not, be delegated away. Respect 
for “one of the most vital of the procedural protections of individual liberty 
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